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Stochastic sequential bargaining games (Merlo and Wilson (1995, 1998)) have found wide ap-
plications in various ￿elds including political economy and macroeconomics due to their ￿ exibility
in explaining delays in reaching agreement. In this paper, we present new results in nonparametric
identi￿cation of such models under di⁄erent scenarios of data availability. First, with complete data
on players￿decisions, the sizes of the surplus to be shared (cakes) and the agreed allocations, both
the mapping from states to the total surplus (i.e. the "cake function") and the players￿common
discount rate are identi￿ed, if the unobservable state variable (USV) is independent of observable
ones (OSV), and the total surplus is strictly increasing in the USV conditional on the OSV. Second,
when the cake size is only observed under agreements and is additively separable in OSV and USV,
the contribution by OSV is identi￿ed provided the USV distribution satis￿es some distributional
exclusion restrictions. Third, if data only report when an agreement is reached but never report the
cake sizes, we propose a simple algorithm that exploits exogenously given shape restrictions on the
cake function and the independence of USV from OSV to recover all rationalizable probabilities
for reaching an agreement under counterfactual state transitions. Numerical examples show the set
of rationalizable counterfactual outcomes so recovered can be informative.
Key words: Nonparametric identi￿cation, non-cooperative bargaining, stochastic sequential
bargaining, rationalizable counterfactual outcomes
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1 Introduction
Starting with the seminal contributions of Stahl (1972) and Rubinstein (1982), noncooperative (or
strategic) bargaining theory has ￿ ourished in the last thirty years. The original model of bilateral
bargaining with alternating o⁄ers and complete information has been extended in a number of
directions allowing for more general extensive forms, information structure and more than two
players (see, e.g., Osborne and Rubinstein (1990), Binmore, Osborne and Rubinstein (1992) for
surveys). The development of the theoretical literature has gone hand in hand with, and for a large
part has been motivated by, the broad range of applications of bargaining models. These include
labor, family, legal, housing, political, and international negotiations (see, e.g., Muthoo (1999)).
The increased availability of data on the outcomes of such negotiations as well as on the details
of the bargaining process has also stimulated a surge in empirical work, where casual empiricism
has progressively lead the way to more systematic attempts to take strategic bargaining models to
data.2
A theoretical framework that has been extensively used in empirical applications is the stochas-
tic bargaining model proposed by Merlo and Wilson (1995, 1998). In this model, the surplus to
be allocated (or the ￿cake￿ ) and the bargaining protocol (i.e., the order in which players can make
o⁄ers and countero⁄ers), are allowed to evolve over time according to a stochastic process. This
feature makes the model ￿ exible (it provides a uni￿ed framework for a large class of bargaining
games), and rationalizes the occurrence of delays in reaching agreement, which are often observed
in actual negotiations, in bargaining environments with complete information. Moreover, for the
case where players share a common discount factor and their utility is linear in the amount of
surplus they receive (which we refer to as the ￿canonical model￿ ), the game has a unique subgame
perfect equilibrium when there are only two players bargaining, and a unique stationary subgame
perfect equilibrium (SSPE) when negotiations are multilateral. The unique equilibrium admitted
by the model is stochastic and characterized by the solution of a ￿xed-point problem which can be
easily computed. For all these reasons, the stochastic bargaining framework naturally lends itself to
estimation and has been used in a variety of empirical applications that range from the formation
of coalition governments in parliamentary democracy (Merlo (1997), Diermeier, Eraslan and Merlo
(2003)), to collective bargaining agreements (Diaz-Moreno and Galdon (2000)), to corporate bank-
ruptcy reorganizations (Eraslan (2008)), to the setting of industry standards in product markets
(Simcoe (2008)), and to sovereign debt renegotiations (Benjamin and Wright (2008), Bi (2008)).
To date, the existing literature on the structural estimation of noncooperative bargaining models
has been entirely parametric. In addition to the body of work cited above based on the stochastic
framework, other bargaining models have also been speci￿ed and parametrically estimated using a
2This path shares many similarities with the development of auction theory in industrial organization.3
variety of data sets.3 However, little is known about whether the structural elements of these models
or the bargaining outcomes in a counterfactual environment can be identi￿ed without imposing
parametric assumptions. This paper contributes to the literature on the estimation of sequential
bargaining models by providing positive results in the nonparametric identi￿cation of stochastic
bargaining models. Our work is not intended to advocate the complete removal of parametric
assumptions on the primitives of these models in structural estimations, as in most cases such
assumptions are instrumental for attaining point-identi￿cation and can be tested. Rather, our
main objective is to understand the limit of what can be learned about the model structure and
rationalizable counterfactual outcomes when researchers wish to remain agnostic about unknown
structural elements of the model.4
Empirical contexts of stochastic bargaining games may di⁄er in what the econometricians ob-
serve in the data. These di⁄erences will in general have important implications on identi￿cation
of the model structures. Here, we consider three scenarios with increasing data limitations. We
refer to these scenarios as ￿complete data￿(where econometricians observe the total surplus to be
allocated or ￿the size of the cake￿in each period regardless of whether an agreement is reached),
￿incomplete data with censored cake sizes￿ (where econometricians only observe the size of the
cake in the period when an agreement is reached), and ￿incomplete data with unobservable cake
sizes￿(where econometricians only observe the timing of agreement, but never observe the value of
the surplus). To illustrate the three data scenarios and introduce some useful notation, consider,
for example, a situation where a group of investors decide to dissolve their partnership and bargain
over how to divide a portfolio they jointly own. The size of the cake is the market value of the
portfolio which is determined by state variables, such as market or macroeconomic conditions, that
evolve over time according to a stochastic process. The investors share the same discount factor
which is the market interest rate. Certain state variables that a⁄ect the market value of the port-
folio are observed by both the investors and the econometricians (OSV), while other state variables
are only known to the investors but not observed by the econometricians (USV). In the complete
data scenario, the econometricians observe the evolution of the market value of the portfolio at all
dates throughout the negotiation. This situation would arise for example if the portfolio is entirely
composed of publicly traded stocks. In the second scenario, the econometricians only observe the
3For example, Sieg (2000) and Watanabe (2006) estimate a bargaining model with asymmetric information or
with uncommon priors, respectively, to study the timing and terms of medical malpractice dispute resolutions. Merlo,
Ortalo-Magne and Rust (2009) estimate a bargaining model with incomplete information to study the timing and
terms of residential real estate transactions.
4In this respect, our work is related to the growing literature on nonparametric identi￿cation and tests of empirical
auction models, pioneered by La⁄ont and Vuong (1996), Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000), Athey and Haile (2002),
Haile and Tamer (2003), Haile, Hong and Shum (2004), Hendricks, Pinkse and Porter (2003). A recent paper by
Chiappori and Donni (2006) also addresses related questions in the context of a static, cooperative (or axiomatic)
bargaining framework and derives su¢ cient conditions on the auxiliary assumptions of the model under which the
Nash bargaining solution generates testable restrictions. We do not review the (theoretical or empirical) literature
on cooperative bargaining here since it is outside of the scope of this paper.4
market value of the portfolio when an agreement is reached but not in any other period during
the negotiation. This would be the case if for example the portfolio is composed of non-publicly
traded securities, but the sale price is recorded. Finally, in the third scenario with the least data,
the econometricians only observe the timing of agreements but never observe the market value
of the portfolio. This would be the case if for example the only available information is when a
partnership is dissolved but the details of the settlement are kept con￿dential (e.g., because of a
court order).
Under each of the three data scenarios described above, we provide conditions that attain
positive results in the identi￿cation of model structures or counterfactuals for the canonical model
of stochastic bargaining. With complete data, we show that the common discount factor can
be uniquely recovered from the distribution of cake sizes and the occurrence of agreements, if
the USV and the order of moves are independent of history conditional on the current OSV.
Furthermore, if given any state observed the total surplus to be allocated is strictly increasing in
the USV, then the cake function (which maps from states into the total surplus) is identi￿ed from
the distribution of cake sizes, provided (i) the USV is independent of OSV and (ii) the bargaining
protocol is independent of the cake sizes given observable states. In the second scenario with
censored cake sizes, we show that when the cake function is additively separable in OSV and USV,
it is nonparametrically identi￿ed if the USV distribution is conditionally independent of a subvector
of OSV, or has multiplicative heterogeneity.
In the third scenario with unobservable cake sizes, we ￿rst note that earlier, known results for
identifying optimal stopping problems apply to our setting. In particular, Berry and Tamer (2006)
showed an additively separable cake function is identi￿ed if the USV is conditionally independent
of all past states given any contemporary OSV, and if the USV distribution is known to econo-
metricians. However, our main contribution under this data scenario is to relax the unrealistic
assumption of known USV distribution, and show partial identi￿cation of counterfactual outcomes
(i.e. probability for reaching an agreement conditional on the OSV) is possible under nonparamet-
ric shape restrictions of the cake function and independence of USV from OSV. Our approach is
motivated by the fact that in practice researchers often know the cake function satis￿es certain
shape restrictions derived exogenously from economic theory, or common senses. For example,
expected market value of a portfolio of foreign assets must be monotone in exchange rates holding
other state variables ￿xed. We argue such knowledge can be exploited to at least con￿ne rational-
izable counterfactual outcomes to an informative subset of the complete outcome space, with the
aid of stochastic restrictions such as independence of USV from OSV. To our knowledge, this is the
￿rst positive result in identifying counterfactuals in a structural optimal stopping model without
assuming knowledge of the USV distribution. We propose a simple but novel algorithm to recover
the complete set of rationalizable counterfactual outcomes (RCO), which are de￿ned as outcomes
in a counterfactual context that are consistent with players￿dynamic rationality, the shape and5
stochastic restrictions of the model, as well as the actual outcomes observed in the data. We use
numerical examples to show the set of RCO recovered can be quite informative and small relative
to the complete outcome space.
We also address the identi￿cation of two extensions of the canonical model of stochastic bar-
gaining where the players evaluate the cake according to a concave utility function, or the discount
factors are heterogeneous across players.5 We show that if players across all bargaining games in
the data are known to follow strategies that lead to the same pro￿les of expected stationary sub-
game perfect equilibrium (SSPE) payo⁄s, then heterogenous discount rates and utility functions
can both be identi￿ed in the case with complete data under fairly weak restrictions on players￿risk
attitudes.6
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the canonical model
of stochastic sequential bargaining and characterizes players￿payo⁄s in stationary subgame perfect
equilibria. Sections 3, 4 and 5 present identi￿cation results in each of the three scenarios with
di⁄erent data availability. Section 6 studies identi￿cation in extensions of the canonical model with
concave utility functions or heterogenous discount rates. Section 7 concludes. Proofs are included
in the appendix.
2 The Canonical Model of Stochastic Bargaining
Consider an in￿nite-horizon bargaining game with K ￿ 2 players (denoted as i = 1;:;K) who
share the same discount factor ￿ 2 (0;1). In each period (indexed by t), all players observe a
vector of states St with support ￿S ￿ RDS where DS denotes the dimension of S. (Throughout the
paper, we use upper case letters for random variables and lower case letters for their realizations.
We use ￿R to denote the support of a generic random vector R, and Rt to denote its history up
to, and including, period t, i.e. Rt ￿ fR1;R2;:;Rtg.) The set of feasible utility vectors to be
allocated in period t with realized state st is given by C(st) = fu 2 RK :
PK
i=1 ui ￿ c(st)g, where
c(st) : ￿S ! R1
+ is the "cake function".7 In each period t, the order of moves among players is
5In the terminology of Merlo and Wilson (1995, 1998), these are stochastic bargaining games with non-transferable
utility, which typically have multiple equilibria.
6In either of the two cases, the pro￿les of SSPE payo⁄s for players are not unique in general. The single-SSPE-
payo⁄ assumption above is analogous to the "single-equilibrium" assumption used in the estimation of simultaneous
games with incomplete information. Such assumptions allow econometricians to link model structures to observable
distributions using theoretical characterizations of Bayesina Nash equilibria (BNE) or (SSPE payo⁄s), while remaining
agnostic about which BNE (or SSPE payo⁄) is realized in the data-generating process.
7This environment assumes that the players have time-separable quasi-linear von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
functions over the commodity space and that a good with constant marginal utility to each player (e.g., money) can
be freely transferred. In the terminology of Merlo and Wilson (1995,1998), this environment is de￿ned as a stochastic
bargaining model with transferable utility.6
given by a permutation of f1;2;:;Kg, denoted as ￿t, whose i-th coordinate ￿t;(i) is the identity of
the player who makes the i-th move. Let ￿￿ denote the set of all possible permutations of the
K-vector. Let ￿t ￿ ￿t;(1) denote the proposer in period t. The transition of states and the order of
moves satisfy the following restriction.
CI-1 (Conditional independence of histories) Conditional on St, (i) ￿t is independent of past
states and orders of moves fSt￿1;￿t￿1g, and (ii) St+1 is independent of ￿t and history fSt￿1;￿t￿1g.
The assumption CI-1 is a rather weak restriction that can be satis￿ed in lots of empirical con-
texts. For example, suppose the order of moves in each period t is determined by a function ￿(St;￿t),
where ￿t consists of noises excluded from St and unobservable both to players and to econometri-
cians. Then conditions in CI-1 are satis￿ed if (i) given St, ￿t is independent of fSt￿1;￿t￿1g and (ii)
given St, St+1 is independent of ￿t and fSt￿1;￿t￿1g. Condition in (i) does rule out the case where
players take deterministic, alternating turns to make o⁄ers. Under CI-1, the transition between
information variables is reduced to
~ Ht(St+1;￿t+1jSt;￿t) = ~ Lt(￿t+1jSt+1)Ht(St+1jSt) (1)
Throughout the paper, we maintain that both the ￿rst-order Markov transition between states
Ht(:j:) and the conditional multinomial distribution ~ Lt are time-homogenous. Thus we will drop
the subscript t from (~ L;H), and use (R;R0) to denote random vectors in the current and the next
period respectively when there is no confusion.
The game is played as follows. At the beginning of each period, players observe the realized
states s and the order of moves ￿ ￿ (￿(1);:;￿(K)) in that period. The proposer ￿ ￿ ￿(1) then
chooses to either pass or propose an allocation in C(s). If he proposes an allocation, player ￿(2)
responds by either accepting or rejecting the proposal. Each player then responds in the order
prescribed by ￿ until either some player rejects the o⁄er or all players accept it. If no proposal is
o⁄ered and accepted by all players, the game moves to the next period where a new state s0 and an
order of moves ￿0 are realized according to the Markov process ~ H. The procedure is then repeated
except that the set of feasible proposals is given by C(s0) in the new period. This game continues
until an allocation is proposed and accepted by all players (if ever). Parameters (H;c; ~ L;￿) are
common knowledge among all players but not known to econometricians. Let ~ St ￿ (St;￿t) denote
the information revealed to players in period t, and let ~ St denote the history of information from
the initial period 0 up to period t. Given any initial state ~ S0 = (s;￿), an outcome (￿;￿￿) consists
of a stopping time ￿ and a random k-vector ￿￿ that is measurable with respect to ~ S￿ such that
￿￿ ￿ (￿￿;i)K
i=1 2 C(S￿) if ￿ < +1 and ￿￿ = 0 if ￿ = +1. (Note the set of feasible allocations is
independent of the order of moves.) Given a realization of (~ s0; ~ s1; ~ s2;::) with ~ st ￿ (st;￿t), ￿ denotes
the period in which a proposal is accepted, and ￿￿ denotes the proposed allocation which is accepted
in state s￿ when the order of moves is ￿￿. For a game starting with state s and order of moves ￿, an
outcome (￿;￿￿) implies a von Neumann-Morgenstern payo⁄ to player i, i.e. E[￿￿￿￿;ij~ S0 = (s;￿)].7
A stationary outcome is such that 9 a measurable subset ~ S(￿) ￿ ￿~ S ￿ ￿S;￿ and a measurable
function ￿ : ~ S(￿) ! Rk such that (i) ~ St 62 ~ S(￿) for all t = 0;1;:;￿ ￿ 1; (ii) ~ S￿ 2 ~ S(￿); and (iii)
￿￿ = ￿(~ S￿). That is, no allocation is implemented until some state and order of moves (s;￿) 2 ~ S(￿)
is realized, in which case a proposal ￿(s;￿) 2 C(s) is accepted. Using property (iii), we let v￿(s;￿) ￿
E[￿￿￿(~ S￿)j~ S0 = (s;￿)] denote the von-Neumann-Morgenstern payo⁄ vector given initial state and
order of moves (s;￿). It follows from the de￿nition of stationary outcome that v￿(s;￿) = ￿(s;￿)
for all (s;￿) 2 ~ S(￿) and v￿(s;￿) = E[￿￿￿(~ S￿)j~ S0 = (s;￿)] for all (s;￿) 62 ~ S(￿). Alternatively we
denote a stationary outcome by (~ S(￿);￿;￿). A history up to a period t is a ￿nite sequence of
realized states, orders of moves, and the actions taken at each state in the sequence up to period t.
A strategy for player i speci￿es a feasible action at every history at which he must act. A strategy
pro￿le is a measurable k-tuple of strategies, one for each player. At any history, a strategy pro￿le
induces an outcome and hence a payo⁄ for each player. A strategy pro￿le is a subgame perfect
equilibrium (SPE) if, at every history, it is a best response to itself. We refer to the outcome and
payo⁄ functions induced by a subgame perfect strategy pro￿le as an SPE outcome and SPE payo⁄
respectively. A strategy pro￿le is stationary if the actions prescribed at any history depend only on
the current state and current o⁄er. A stationary SPE (SSPE) outcome and payo⁄ are the outcome
and payo⁄ generated by a subgame perfect strategy pro￿le which is stationary. Let vi : ￿S;￿ ! R1
+
denote SSPE payo⁄s for player i = 1;:;K, and w =
PK
i=1 vi denote total SSPE payo⁄s of all players
in the bargaining games. Let FK denote the set of bounded measurable functions on ￿S;￿ taking
values in RK. Lemma 1 collects main results characterizing agents￿behaviors and outcomes in
SSPE of the bargaining game.
Lemma 1 Suppose CI-1 holds. Then (a) f 2 FK is a unique SSPE payo⁄ if and only if A(f) = f
where for all (s;￿) 2 ￿S;￿,
Ai(f)(s;￿) ￿ maxfc(s) ￿ ￿E[
P
j6=i fj(S0;￿0)jS = s] ; ￿E[fi(S0;￿0)jS = s]g, if ￿(1) = i
Aj(f)(s;￿) ￿ ￿E[fj(S0;￿0)jS = s], if ￿(1) 6= j
(b) the SSPE total payo⁄ w is independent of ￿ given s, and solves
w(s) = maxfc(s);￿E[w(S0)jS = s]g
for all s 2 ￿S; (c) A unanimous agreement is reached in state s if and only if c(s) ￿ ￿E[w(S0)jS =
s].
The proof uses results in Theorems 1-3 in Merlo and Wilson (1998) and exploits conditions in
CI-1 to show that the total payo⁄in SSPE and the occurrence of agreement are independent of the
order of moves conditional on realized states. This important property of SSPE is instrumental for
some of the positive identi￿cation results below. Econometricians are interested in recovering the
parameters (H;c; ~ L;￿) underlying the bargaining game using the distribution of states and decisions8
of o⁄ers/acceptances observed. The data report players￿proposals and decisions in a large number
of bargaining games. In each period, the state variable S consists of X 2 ￿X ￿ RDX (which is
observed by players and econometricians) and ￿ 2 R1 (which is only observed by players but not
econometricians). For each of the bargaining games, econometricians observe time to agreement
after the initial period, the identity of the proposer and observable states X in every period, but
not ￿. In this paper, we discuss identi￿cation of the model under di⁄erent scenarios where cake sizes
and agreed proposals may or may not be observable in the data. A typical structural approach
for inferring parameters from observables posits that all bargaining games observed in the data
share (i) the same transition of states (given by the conditional multinomial distribution ~ L and the
Markov process H in (1)); and (ii) the same cake function c : ￿S ! R1. Furthermore, the players
in all observed bargaining games follow SSPE strategies.
In practice, data may report cross-sectional variations in the number of players K and their
individual characteristics ZK, where ZK ￿ (Z1;:;ZK) with Zi 2 RJ for i = 1;:;K. Such pro￿les of
individual characteristics vary across bargaining games observed in the data, but remain the same
throughout each given game. Of course the primitives (H;c; ~ L) may also depend on (K;ZK). These
individual characteristics are perfectly observable in data and ￿xed over time, and our identi￿cation
arguments throughout the paper are presented as conditional on (K;ZK). We suppress dependence
of structural elements c, ~ L, H and the distributions of (X;￿) observed on the vector (K;ZK) only
for the sake of notational simplicity.
3 Identi￿cation with Complete Data
In this section we consider identi￿cation of the cake function and the common discount rate in
the canonical stochastic bargaining model when econometricians observe a complete history of (i)
observable states Xt and sizes of the cake Yt = c(Xt;￿t) (but not ￿t); (ii) whether a unanimous
agreement is reached in period t (denoted by a dummy variable Dt); and (iii) the order of moves
and the identity of the proposer (denoted ￿t) in each period throughout the bargaining game.
Econometricians also observe the division of the cake when an agreement occurs (denoted (￿i;￿)K
i=1 2
RK
+ where ￿ is the termination period in which an agreement is reached), but may not observe
details of the proposal in any period when no agreement is reached. We shall show that with such
complete data, all model primitives can be identi￿ed under fairly weak, stochastic restrictions on
state transitions and shape restrictions on the cake function. For any two generic random vectors
R1;R2, we use FR2jR1 to denote distribution of R2 conditional on R1. Let FX0 denote the initial
distribution of observable states X0 at the start of the bargaining game, and let ￿X denote its
support. We maintain the following restrictions on the transition between states throughout this
section.9
CI-2 (C.I. of unobservable states) (i) Conditional on Xt+1, ￿t+1 is independent of (Xt;￿t) for
all t; and (ii) conditional on Xt, Xt+1 is independent of ￿t for all t.
The condition CI-2 requires dynamics between current and next period￿ s states S and S0 to be
captured by persistence between observable states X and X0 only. Let GX0jX denote transitions
between X and X0, and F￿jX denote the conditional distribution of the unobservable state given
X. Then CI-2 implies for all t,
H(St+1jSt) = F(￿t+1jXt+1)G(Xt+1jXt)
This assumption appears in a wide range of structural dynamic models in industrial organization
and labour economics (e.g. Rust (1987)). An important implication of CI-1,2 is that conditional on
Xt, (St+1;￿t+1) are jointly independent of ￿t.8 Throughout the paper, we maintain the regularity
condition that for all t and x 2 ￿X, Pr(Xt+1 2 !jXt = x) > 0 for all ! ￿ ￿X s.t. Pr(X0 2
!) > 0. Under CI-1,2, parameters ￿ ￿ (￿;c; ~ L￿jS;F￿jX) remain to be identi￿ed, while both the
OSV transition GX0jX and the distribution of initial states X0 can be directly recovered from data.
De￿ne a feature ￿(:) as a mapping from a vector of parameters ￿ to some space of features. For
example, ￿(￿) can be a subvector of (￿;c; ~ L￿jS;F￿jX), or some functional of c or F￿jX. Below we
give a formal de￿nition of identi￿cation with complete data under CI-1,2.
De￿nition 1 Let ￿ denote a set of unknown parameters (￿;c; ~ L￿jS;F￿jX) that satisfy certain known
restrictions. Two parameters ￿;￿0 are observationally equivalent (denoted
o:e:
~ ) under ￿ if ￿;￿0 2 ￿
and both generate the same joint distribution of stopping time ￿, agreed allocations ￿￿ ￿ (￿￿;i)K
i=1
and fXt;Yt;￿tg￿
t=0. A feature of the true parameter ￿￿ (denoted ￿(￿￿)) is identi￿ed under ￿ if
￿(￿￿) = ￿(￿) for all ￿
o:e:
~ ￿￿ in ￿.
By de￿nition, any feature of the truth ￿(￿￿) that can be expressed in terms of observable distrib-
utions is identi￿ed. Note observational equivalence and identi￿cation with complete data are de￿ned
under assumptions CI-1,2 and any possible additional restrictions on parameters (￿;c; ~ L￿jS;F￿jX).
Our point of departure in discussing identi￿cation is that the data-generating process (DGP) is
correctly speci￿ed with certain parameters under CI-1,2. This implicitly requires that the observ-
able distributions necessarily satisfy testable restrictions implied by CI-1,2 (see the lemma below),
so that the identi￿cation region for the parameter ￿￿ (i.e. the set of ￿ such that ￿
o:e:
~ ￿￿) is not
vacuously empty.
Lemma 2 Suppose CI-1,2 hold. Then (a) a joint distribution of (￿;￿￿;fXt;Yt;￿tg￿
t=0) is generated











by some ￿ under SSPE only if (i) Y￿ =
P
i ￿￿;i, (ii) when ￿ ￿ 1,
FYt+1;Dt+1;￿t+1;Xt+1jxt;￿t = FYt+1;Dt+1;￿t+1jXt+1GXt+1jxt ; 8xt;￿t (2)
F￿t+1;￿t+1jDt+1=1;xt+1;xt;￿t = F￿t+1;￿t+1jDt+1=1;xt+1 ; 8xt+1;￿t (3)
for all xt;￿t and 1 ￿ t ￿ ￿ ￿ 1, and (iii) FYt;Dt;￿tjXt and F￿t;￿tjDt=1;Xt are time-homogenous (i.e.
the same for all t ￿ 0); and (b) any two ￿
o:e:
~ ￿0 if and only if they also generate the same static,
time-homogenous conditional distributions F￿;DjX, FY jD=0;X;￿ and F￿jD=1;X;￿ almost everywhere on
￿X in SSPE.
Part (a) of the lemma summarizes the necessary testable restrictions on observable distributions
under CI-1,2, while part (b) gives a simpler formulation of the conditions under which ￿;￿0 are
observationally equivalent.
MT (Monotonicity) Both c(x;") and F￿jX=x(") are strictly increasing in " for all x 2 ￿X.
Lemma 3 Under CI-1,2 and MT, the common discount factor ￿ is identi￿ed.
The intuition of this result is as follows. Under CI-1,2, the ex ante total continuation payo⁄(i.e.
￿w(s) ￿ E[w(S0)js]) must be a function of x only, and does not depend on ". As a result, ￿w(x)
can alternatively be expressed as the unique solution of a "quasi-structural" ￿xed-point (QSFP)
equation de￿ned by the unknown ￿ and the distribution of (Y;D;X) observed. The pre￿x "quasi-"
here is intended to highlight that structural elements ￿;c;F￿jX enter the ￿xed-point formulation
indirectly through distributions of (Y;D;X). The assumption MT is instrumental, as it ensures a
one-to-one mapping between Y and ￿ given X. (The discount rate ￿ also enters the QSFP equation
directly.) With observable distributions ￿xed from data, ￿w as a solution to the QSFP equation
is shown to be strictly monotone in ￿. This implies the probability for reaching an agreement
Pr(D = 1jx) = 1 ￿ FY jX=x(￿￿w(x)) is also strictly monotone in ￿ under MT, with distribution of
(Y;D;X) observed and ￿xed from data. Therefore, ￿ is point-identi￿ed.
Additional restrictions are necessary for identifying the cake function c, the proposer-choosing
mechanism ~ L￿jS, and the USV distribution F￿jX.
CI-3 (C.I. of order of moves) For all t, the order of moves ￿t is independent of ￿t given Xt.
Condition CI-3 requires the order of moves realized in each period to be uninformative about
unobserved states given X. (Among other things, the condition CI-3 is satis￿ed if the order of
moves is determined by a function ￿(x;￿) where ￿ is independent of ￿ conditional on X.) It implies
Yt = c(St) is independent of ￿t conditional on Xt. As Lemma 1 shows, occurrence of a unanimous
agreement Dt and the cake sizes Yt only depend on the current state St realized but not on the11
identity of the proposer (i.e. the "separation principle" in Merlo and Wilson (1995)). Hence CI-3
implies both Yt and Dt are independent of the order of moves ￿t conditional on Xt. With this
assumption, ~ L￿jS = L￿jX and it is directly identi￿ed from observable distributions along with
￿;GX0jX. Thus under CI-1,2,3, only (c;F￿jX) remain to be identi￿ed in the canonical stochastic
sequential bargaining model. Our next result shows that, with ￿,L(￿jX) identi￿ed, any two pairs
￿ ￿ (c;F￿jX) and ￿0 ￿ (c0;F0
￿jX) are observationally equivalent under CI-1,2,3 if and only if they
generate the same joint distribution of cake sizes and observable states.
Proposition 1 Suppose CI-1,2,3 and MT hold. Then both ￿,L￿jX are identi￿ed, and ￿
o:e:
~ ￿0 if and
only if FY jX(￿) = FY jX(￿0) a.e. on ￿X.
The proposition holds under weaker restrictions F(St+1;￿t+1jSt) = F(St+1;￿t+1jXt) and CI-
3.9 The intuition of the result is as follows. The occurrence of an agreement only depends on
the evolution of cake sizes, which is independent of the order of moves conditional on X under the
assumptions above. The order of moves only determines who receives the "gains to the proposer".10
Under CI-1,2,3, L￿jX is identi￿ed directly along with ￿, and any rationalizable distribution of
observables must necessarily satisfy FY;￿jX = FY jXL￿jX. Hence any pair of parameters ￿ and ￿0
that generate the same distribution of cakes FY jX must necessarily be observationally equivalent.
Without Proposition 1, we would not know what transformations of the truth (c;F￿jX) can
lead to the same distributions of terminal periods ￿ and the division of cakes under unanimous
agreements ￿￿, and therefore would not know what normalizations of F￿ is needed to attain full
identi￿cation of the model. The result in Proposition 1 implies the same normalizations used
for identifying the nonadditive random function Y = c(X;￿) are also necessary for identifying
the canonical stochastic bargaining model. Based on this ￿nding, the rest of this section taps
into results in nonparametric identi￿cation and estimation of non-additive random functions by
Matzkin (2003), and shows identi￿cation of c;F￿jX under the independence of USV and OSV as
well as appropriate normalizations.
SI (Statistical independence) ￿t are i.i.d. across bargaining periods and independent from Xt.
Let
P
MS denote the set of ￿ satisfying MT and SI. Let ~ ￿ ￿ (~ c; ~ F￿) and ￿ ￿ (c;F￿) denote any
two generic pairs of structural elements in ￿MS.





10Without CI-3, the result of the proposition would be "￿
o:e:
~ ￿
0 if and only if FY;￿jX(￿) = FY;￿jX(￿
0) a.e. on ￿X".
To ￿nd out what normalizations are innocuous for identi￿cation, we would need to introduce further structures on
how the distribution of ￿ is related to Y given X.12
Corollary 1 (Matzkin (2003)) Suppose CI-1,2,3, MT and SI hold. Then (a) ~ ￿
o:e:
~ ￿ for ￿; ~ ￿ 2
P
MS
if and only if ~ c(x;~ ") = c(x;g￿1(~ ")) and ~ F￿(~ ") = F￿(g￿1(~ ")) for some increasing function g; and (b)
(c;F￿jX) are identi￿ed if c(￿ x;") = " for some ￿ x and all ".
Given the result in Proposition 1, both parts follow immediately from Matzkin (2003). Part
(a) implies at least a normalization of the unobserved state is necessary to attain identi￿cation
of the cake function, even with ￿ ￿xed and known and ￿ restricted to be independent from X.
In part (b), the assumption MT guarantees the mapping between the cake size and the USV
(latent disturbance) is one-to-one for any x. Then assumption SI ensures F￿ is just-identi￿ed as
F￿(t) = FY jX=￿ x(t) under the normalization c(￿ x;") = " for some ￿ x and all ". It then follows c is
identi￿ed as c(x;") = F￿1
Y jX=x(FY jX=￿ x(")).11
4 Incomplete Data with Censored Cake Sizes
In this section, we discuss identi￿cation of the canonical stochastic bargaining model when the
size of the cakes and the accepted proposals can only be observed under a unanimous agreement.
In such a case, theory predicts the distribution of cake sizes observed is censored at the expected
present value of total continuation payo⁄s for all players in SSPE (i.e. ￿E[w(S0)js]). As in the
case with complete data in Section 3, the common discount factor can be recovered from joint
distribution of observable states, stopping times and agreed allocations under CI-1,2. Hence, we
treat ￿ as identi￿ed throughout this section. The major theme of this section is that additional
restrictions on the cake function (i.e. additive separability in X and ￿) and the unobservable
state distribution (such as multiplicative heterogeneity or distributional exclusion restriction) are
su¢ cient for identi￿cation of the cake function despite the loss of information about cake sizes when
no agreement is reached.
4.1 Identi￿cation under multiplicative heterogeneity
We start with a class of models where unobservable state variables (USV) are known to belong
to a "location-scale" family. This subsumes zero-mean normally distributed USV with variance
depending on observable states.
AS (Additive Separability) The cake function is given by c(x;") = ~ c(x) + " for all s 2 ￿S.
11Matzkin (2003) also noted that a slight extension of the identi￿cation arguments above suggests c can be
identi￿ed when (i) X ￿ (X0;X1) with ￿ independent of X1 conditional on X0; and (ii) c(x;") is normalized by letting
c(x0; ￿ x1;") = " for all x0;".13
MH (Multiplicative Heterogeneity) (i) For all t, the disturbance ￿t = ￿(Xt)~ ￿t, where ~ ￿t is i.i.d.
across bargaining games and all periods, independent of the process of observable states fXtg+1
t=0,
has median 0, and positive densities over R1; (ii) The scale function ￿(X) is continuous, strictly
positive and bounded on ￿X.
MH implies the independence of ￿t from history of states conditional on Xt, therefore the
discounted ex ante total SSPE continuation payo⁄s ￿w(S) ￿ ￿E[w(S0)jS] must be a function of
X only and does not involve ￿. With ￿ identi￿ed, ￿w(X) ￿ E[w(S0)jX] can be fully recovered
from observed distributions FY;DjX and GX0jX. (Alternatively, ￿￿w(X) can be simply identi￿ed
as the lower end of support of the cake sizes observed under unanimous agreements conditional
on X.) Under AS, the distribution of the gains from being a proposer under state x (de￿ned as
Y ￿ ￿ Y ￿ ￿￿w(X)) is identical to that of maxf￿(X) + ￿;0g, where ￿(x) ￿ ~ c(x) ￿ ￿￿w(x) should
be intuitively interpreted as the conditional median of the proposer gains.
We then apply results in Chen, Dahl and Khan (2005) for censored regression models to identify
the function of conditional median cake sizes ~ c. The unbounded support condition in MH is stronger
than necessary, as the identi￿cation arguments only need that for all x 2 ￿X, support of ~ ￿ is
large enough to ensure the gains to the proposer is greater than zero (and therefore unanimous
agreements occur) with positive probability. The zero median is a location normalization necessary
for identifying ￿. Most importantly, the support condition and the location-scale speci￿cation
ensure the conditional quantiles of "normalized" cake sizes are linear in unknown parameters, i.e.
q￿(Y ￿jx) = ￿(x) + ￿(x)c￿ for all x (where c￿ is the ￿-th quantile of ~ ￿) for some ￿ close enough to
1. This linearity is crucial for attaining the identi￿cation of ~ c.
RG (Regularity) (i) ~ c(x) is continuous and bounded on ￿X; (ii) for all continuous and bounded
functions b(x) on ￿X,
R
maxf~ c(x)+";b(x)gdF￿jX("jx) is bounded and continuous in x; (iii) G(x0jx)
satis￿es the Feller Property (i.e. mapping continuous, bounded functions to continuous, bounded
functions).
SG (Support of gains) Pr(X 2 ￿+
X) > 0 where ￿+
X ￿ fx : ￿(x) > 0g.
Proposition 2 (i) Under CI-1, AS, MH, RG and SG, ￿ is identi￿ed, and both ~ c(X) and ￿(X)
are identi￿ed on ￿X from the distribution of cake sizes censored under unanimous agreements. (ii)
The condition SG can be tested using the conditional distribution FDjX.
Since AS and MH imply CI-2 and MT, the same arguments in Lemma 3 above suggest con-
ditions CI-1 and MH guarantee the common discount factor ￿ can be uniquely recovered from
observable distributions. With ￿ (and therefore ￿￿w(x)) identi￿ed, the rest of the identi￿cation
proof follows from Chen, Dahl and Khan (2005). Condition SG guarantees ￿ can be identi￿ed
directly as Med(Y ￿jx) over ￿+
X, which happens with a positive probability. Condition RG are14
regularity conditions that guarantee ￿(x) is bounded and continuous on ￿X. This ensures the con-
ditional quantiles q￿(Y ￿jx) must be strictly positive for some ￿ greater than 1=2 and close enough
to 1 even for all x 62 ￿+
X. By construction, for such values of ￿, q￿(Y ￿jx) must also be positive
for all x 2 ￿X. Under SG, we can recover these high quantiles of unobservable states (i.e. c￿)
through a linear system that relates the conditional quantiles of cake sizes to ￿(x), ￿(x) and c￿ for
x 2 ￿+
X. Knowledge of these high quantiles c￿ are used to identify ￿(x) and ￿(x) for x 62 ￿+
X using
the equation q￿(Y ￿jx) = ￿(x) + ￿(x)c￿ for ￿ close enough to 1. The major identifying restriction
SG is testable, as the event "￿(x) > 0" is equivalent to "Prf￿ > ￿￿(x)jxg > 1
2" with ￿ having
strictly positive densities around 0, and Median(￿jx) = 0 for all x 2 ￿X. Therefore, this condition
is equivalent to PrfPr(D = 1jX) > 1
2g > 0 and can be tested using observable distributions.
4.2 Identi￿cation under exclusion restriction
While contributing to identi￿cation of ~ c, multiplicative heterogeneity of ￿ also restricts the set of
observable distributions that are consistent with the canonical model of stochastic bargaining. In
particular, the MH assumption has stringent restrictions on conditional quantiles of the gains to
the proposer given X. For any pair of observable states fxkg2
k=1 and any four percentiles f￿jg4
j=1
such that q￿j(y￿jxk) > 0 for j = 1;2;3;4 and k = 1;2, the ratio between conditional interquantile
range of the cakes must be independent of realized states. That is,
￿(x1;(￿j)4
j=1) ￿
q￿1(Y ￿jx1) ￿ q￿2(Y ￿jx1)






In this subsection, we consider alternative identifying assumptions that would avoid such a stringent
restrictions on observable distributions.
ER (Exclusion restriction) X = (X0;X1) and ￿ is independent of X1 given X0 in each period.
RS (Rich support) ￿ has positive densities over R1 conditional on all x0, and Median(￿jx) = 0
for all x 2 ￿X.
SG2 (Support of gains) Pr(X 2 ￿+
Xjx0) > 0 for all x0.
Proposition 3 Under CI-1,2, AS, RG, ER, RS and SG2, the discount rate ￿ is identi￿ed and the
cake function ~ c(X) is identi￿ed on the support ￿X.
AS, CI-1,2 guarantee the distribution of gains to the proposer is generated through a censored
regression. (Now that MH is dropped, CI-2 needs to be stated explicitly.) Conditions CI-1,2 deliver
the identi￿cation of ￿ as before. In contrast with the case with MH, under ER the conditional15
quantiles of gains to the proposer Y ￿ ￿ Y ￿ ￿￿w are additively separable in ￿ and the quantiles
of the USV conditional on observable states. That is, q￿(Y ￿jx) = ￿(x) + c￿(x) for all x 2 ￿X,
where c￿(x) is an in￿nite dimensional nuisance parameter. Conditions RG and RS ensure that ￿
is bounded on ￿X while ￿￿ is not. Hence q￿(Y ￿jx) > 0 holds even for x 62 ￿+
X provided ￿ is greater
than 1=2 and close enough to 1. Conditions ER and SG2 allow us to ￿x any x0 and exploit "enough"
variations in x1 alone to reach some state ~ x ￿ (x0; ~ x1) 2 ￿+
X. With a slight abuse of notation, note
ER implies c￿(~ x) = c￿(x0) for any ￿ ￿ 1=2, and these are recovered as q￿(Y ￿j~ x) ￿ ￿(~ x) with both
components observed directly for ~ x 2 ￿+
X. With knowledge of the nuisance parameter c￿(x0) for
any ￿ ￿ 1=2, ￿(x) can be identi￿ed for x 62 ￿+
X as q￿ ￿(Y ￿jx) ￿ c￿ ￿(x0) for some ￿ ￿ greater than 1=2
and close enough to 1. Then ~ c is recovered on ￿X as the sum of ￿ and ￿￿w(x). The exclusion
restriction has some simple, testable restrictions on observable distributions:
q￿(Y ￿jx) ￿ q￿(Y ￿j~ x) = q￿0(Y ￿jx) ￿ q￿0(Y ￿j~ x) = ￿(x) ￿ ￿(~ x)
for all ￿;￿0;x; ~ x such that minfq￿(x);q￿(~ x);q￿0(x);q￿0(~ x)g > 0 and x0 = ~ x0. We leave the con-
struction of nonparametric estimators and discussion of their statistical properties for future work.
We conclude this section by noting that with ￿ identi￿ed ￿rst, ~ c is recovered from the censored
distribution of cake sizes alone under the assumptions above. The distribution of allocations of
the cake under agreements are not involved in the identi￿cation of ~ c above. This is because of the
additional identifying power from the independence of ~ c from the order of moves given the OSV,
and the new structures imposed through the assumptions AS and MH or ER.
5 Incomplete Data with Unobservable Cake Sizes
In some other empirical contexts, econometricians can observe realized states in all periods and
when a unanimous agreement is reached, but never observe the cake sizes, the order of moves, or
the agreed allocations. For example, such a scenario arises when all parties involved in the game
choose to keep details of negotiations and agreements con￿dential, and outsiders (econometricians)
only get to observe factors that are known to a⁄ect the cake sizes. Econometricians seek to learn
enough about the underlying structures (i.e. cake functions, distributions of the USV, etc) to
predict probabilities for an agreement under counterfactual contexts (such as when the transition
between states are perturbed). Suppose conditions CI-1,2 hold. Let ￿ denote the set of generic
restrictions on unknown parameters ￿ ￿ (￿;c;F￿jX).12
12Throughout this section, we maintain that the common discount factor ￿ is known to econometricians. Within
the class of canonical models where players￿utilities are transferrable, this restriction is often justi￿able as the discount
rate can usually be recovered exogenously. For example, in some empirical applications, the cake size is measured
in monetary terms and the discount rate can be estimated as the interest rate that lasts throughout the bargaining
process.16
De￿nition 2 Two parameters ￿ and ￿0 are observationally equivalent (denoted
o:e:
~ ) under ￿ if
￿;￿0 2 ￿, FDjX(￿) = FDjX(￿0) a.e. on ￿X. A feature of the truth ￿￿ (denoted ￿(￿￿)) is identi￿ed
under ￿ if ￿(￿￿) = ￿(￿) for all ￿
o:e:
~ ￿￿ under ￿.
As in the canonical model with complete data, identi￿cation is de￿ned under conditional inde-
pendence restrictions CI-1,2. In contrast with the previous scenarios, observational equivalence in
the data scenario considered in this section only requires parameters to generate identical static,
conditional probabilities of unanimous agreements FDjX only. This is because now neither the orders
of moves nor the agreed allocations of the cake are observed in data. Our point of departure in dis-
cussion of identi￿cation in this section is that the model is correctly speci￿ed under CI-1,2 for some
parameters (￿;c;F￿jX; ~ L￿jS). Thus it is implicitly required that the distributions observed neces-
sarily satisfy testable restrictions of these assumptions (i.e. FDt+1;Xt+1jDt;Xt = FDt+1jXt+1GXt+1jXt,
with F;G time-homogenous) so that the identi￿cation region is not vacuously empty. Also note CI-
3 (conditional independence of ￿ from ￿ given X) is dropped as the order of moves is not observed
in the current scenario.
5.1 Identifying the cake function with known USV distribution
We start by examining what can be learned about model primitives in the simplest case where
the distribution of USV is known to econometricians. Throughout this section, we maintain the
AS assumption that the cake function is additively separable in states observed and USV, i.e.
c(s) = ~ c(x) ￿ " for some unknown function ~ c. The following lemma shows that at least some
scale and location normalizations of F￿jX are required to identify ~ c, and such normalizations are
innocuous for predicting counterfactual agreement probabilities.
Lemma 4 Under AS, CI-1,2, the location and scale of F￿jX cannot be identi￿ed jointly with ~ c.
This lemma is proved by showing that if the model is correctly speci￿ed for some (~ c;F￿jX), then
any a¢ ne transformations (a~ c(x)+b;F￿jX("￿b
a jx)) can also generate the same agreement probability
Pr(D = 1jX) a.e. on ￿X. The lemma implies that scale and locational normalizations of F￿jX are
innocuous for predicting agreement probabilities under counterfactual changes in ￿ or GX0jX. To
see this, simply note the a¢ ne transformations above are independent of the discount rate and the
transitions between observable states. Thus for any given (￿;G), the same a¢ ne transformation of
the true parameters (~ c;F￿jX) is observationally equivalent to the truth both in the data-generating
process (DGP) and in the counterfactual context of interest.
This also suggests the common assumption in empirical work that F￿jX is known to researchers
is less restrictive than it seems. Consider the cases where distributions of unobserved states are17
known to be independent of X and belong to the normal family. Then restricting F￿jX to be N(0;1)
in estimation is equivalent to introducing a local and scale normalization that is innocuous. This is
also true with other parametric families characterized by location and scale parameters only. Berry
and Tamer (2006) showed a positive result in identifying optimal-stopping models when the USV
distribution F￿jX is known to econometricians. Their result also applies in our context of canonical
stochastic bargaining models.
Proposition 4 (Berry and Tamer (2006)) Suppose c(s) = ~ c(x) ￿ " for some unknown function
~ c, and suppose ￿ is known, AS, CI-1,2 hold and F￿jX=x is known and strictly increasing for all
x 2 ￿X. Then (i) ~ c is identi￿ed for x 2 ￿X. (ii) If ~ c(￿ x) is known for some ￿ x 2 ￿X, both ￿ and ~ c
are identi￿ed.
As shown in Section 2, theory suggests a "separation principle" where occurrence of a unanimous
agreement only depends on states S realized but not on the identity of the proposer under SSPE.
A bargaining game ends when the realized cake size exceeds the ex ante total continuation payo⁄.
Berry and Tamer (2006) showed with knowledge of the discount factor and the distribution of the
USV, the optimal decision rule in dynamic stopping problems can also be fully recovered from
conditional probabilities of agreements. This in turn helps identify the cake function. We adapt
their proof in our context in the appendix.
5.2 Rationalizable counterfactual outcomes when USV distribution is unknown
When the unobservable state variable (USV) distribution is not known to belong to certain location-
scale parametric family, imposing a speci￿c form of F￿jX that deviates from the truth can imply
incorrect results in counterfactual outcomes. (See the example in the next subsection.) On the
other hand, economic theories often suggest the structural elements of the model have to satisfy
certain nonparametric shape or stochastic restrictions (such as monotonicity or concavity of the
cake function or independence of ￿ from X). This naturally raises the question: how can econo-
metricians exploit such exogenously given restrictions to infer counterfactual outcomes without
imposing parametric assumptions on the structure? We propose a simple, novel algorithm that
helps recover the complete set of all rationalizable probabilities for reaching an agreement in coun-
terfactual bargaining contexts where transitions between states are perturbed.
For the rest of this subsection, we maintain that ￿ is statistically independent of X (Assumption
SI). We begin by noting a pair of parameters (~ c;F￿) is observationally equivalent to the true
parameters if and only if the following equation is satis￿ed:
q(p(x);F￿) ￿ F￿1
￿ (p(x)) = ~ c(x) ￿ ￿￿w(x;p;F￿)18
where p(x) is the probability for reaching an agreement conditional on x, and ￿w(x;p;F￿) is the ex
ante total continuation payo⁄s in SSPE and solves the ￿xed point equation:
￿w(x) =
Z
maxf~ c(x0) ￿ "0;￿￿w(x0)gdF("0jx0)G(x0jx)
=
Z







￿ (p) ￿ "dF￿(")
The latter will be referred to as the "conditional surplus function" (CSF) hereafter. Note the
second equality in (4) uses the fact that p(x) = F￿(~ c(x) ￿ ￿￿w(x)) For the rest of this subsection,
we will focus on the case where the support of X is ￿nite.
DS (Discrete support) The support of X (denoted ￿X) is ￿nite with M elements fx1;x2;:;xMg.
In discretized notations, a pair of parameters (~ c;F￿jX) is observationally equivalent to the true
parameters underlying the DGP if and only if the following system of M linear equations holds:
Q = ~ C ￿ ￿￿ (5)
where Q, ~ C, ￿ are M-vectors with Qm ￿ F￿1
￿ (p(xm)), ~ Cm ￿ ~ c(xm), and ￿ solves
￿ = G(￿￿ + ￿) (6)
where ￿ is a M-vector with the m-th coordinate de￿ned as ￿m ￿ ￿(p(xm)), and G is the M-by-
M transition matrix with the (m;n)-th entry de￿ned as Gmn ￿ Pr(X0 = xnjX = xm). Note the
probabilities of reaching an agreement p ￿ (p(x1);:;p(xM)) enters the system de￿ning observational
equivalence through ￿. in both Q and ￿. We shall normalize q(1=2) = 0 and ￿(1=2) = ￿ ￿ for some
strictly positive constant ￿ ￿. (Note from our discussions in the previous subsection, such scale and
location normalizations are innocuous for identifying counterfactual agreement probabilities when
~ c or G are perturbed.) Under this normalization, ~ c(x) is the median cake size given state x.
In some empirical contexts, econometricians know ~ C satis￿es certain shape restrictions that
are derived exogenously from economic theory or common sense. Such restrictions can often be
represented as a system of linear restrictions on the vector ~ C. For example, if the state x has three
possible values x1 < x2 < x3 and ~ C is known to be strictly increasing and concave. Then ~ C is











Similar matrices of coe¢ cients can be constructed if ~ c is only known to be increasing or concave in
one of the coordinates in a multivariate x. Besides, any ranking of a subset of the states by ~ c(x)
can also be represented as linear restrictions on ~ C. For example, if a certain state xm is known
to lead to the strictly smallest median size of the cake, this will lead to additional M ￿ 1 strict
inequalities.
Given a set of exogenously given restrictions on the structure ~ C and F￿jX, a vector of agreement
probabilities p observed is rationalized if there exist ~ C;F￿jX such that (i) ~ C;F￿jX satisfy these
restrictions and (ii) p is generated as players make dynamic rational choices in SSPE given ~ C;F￿jX
(i.e. p satis￿es (5), (6) under ~ C;F￿jX). The next lemma gives su¢ cient and necessary conditions
for a vector p to be rationalized when ~ C satis￿es some linear restrictions and ￿ is independent of
X. Let V(m) denote the m-th smallest element in a generic vector V . Let ￿ ￿ be any strictly positive
constant.
Lemma 5 Suppose AS, CI-1,2 and DS, SI hold, ￿ is known and c(S) = ~ c(X)￿￿ with Median(￿) =
0 for an unknown function ~ c that satis￿es a set of linear restrictions A ~ C > 0. Then a vector of the
probability of agreements p observed in the DGP is rationalized if and only if the following linear
system holds for some vectors Q;￿:
A
￿
Q + ￿(I ￿ ￿G)￿1G￿
￿
> 0 (7)
Qm ￿ Qn , pm ￿ pn; 8m;n 2 f1;:;Mg (8)
p(m)(Q(m+1) ￿ Q(m)) ￿ ￿(m+1) ￿ ￿(m) ￿ p(m+1)(Q(m+1) ￿ Q(m)); 8m 2 f1;:;M ￿ 1g (9)
Qm ￿ 0 , pm ￿ 1=2 and 1
2Qm ￿ ￿m ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ pmQm, 8m 2 f1;:;Mg (10)
￿m > 0 for m 2 f1;:;Mg (11)
Two remarks are in order. First, the feasibility of the linear system is not only necessary but
also su¢ cient for a vector of agreement probabilities p to be rationalized in a model of stochastic
bargaining. Su¢ ciency follows from the fact that when the linear system holds, a pair of structural
elements ( ~ C;F￿) can be constructed to rationalize p under CI-1,2, DS and SI as probability for
agreements in SSPE. More speci￿cally, such a F￿ can be constructed through interpolations between
Q (with its CSF satisfying constraints in (9)), and ~ C = Q + ￿(I ￿ ￿G)￿1G￿. Second, without the
shape restrictions A ~ C > 0, the lemma would be vacuous in the sense that we would always be able
to de￿ne Q;￿ recursively from any p 2 (0;1)M and the linear system (8)-(11), and then de￿ne ~ C
as above so that p is rationalized by ( ~ C;F￿) under CI-1,2, DS and SI. In other words, without the
shape restrictions A ~ C > 0, any p in (0;1)M must be rationalized by some ( ~ C;F￿).
A standard approach for structural analyses of probabilities for agreements under counterfac-
tual environments (such as perturbations in the state transitions or the cake function) would take
two steps. First, identify and estimate the cake function ~ c and the USV distribution F￿ using20
observable distributions from the DGP, and second, use the identi￿ed parameters to predict the
conditional probability of reaching agreements in the counterfactual contexts. Unfortunately, when
the USV distribution is not restricted to take any known parametric form, ~ c and F￿ may not be
uniquely recovered from observables, and the ￿rst step fails. This non-identi￿cation is obvious
from the lemma above, as the vector (Q;￿) (i.e. the percentiles and the CSF corresponding to the
USV distribution) that satis￿es this linear system is not unique. For the rest of this section, we
shall argue that, despite this non-identi￿cation result, a simple algorithm can be used to recover all
rationalizable conditional agreement probabilities under counterfactual contexts. These are coun-
terfactual agreement probabilities consistent with the model structure and restrictions (including
shape restrictions on ~ c such as monotonicity, and stochastic restrictions on USV distribution such
as independence of ￿ from X).
Below we formally de￿ne rationalizable counterfactual outcomes. Suppose the data-generating
process (DGP) is characterized by true parameters ~ c0;F0
￿ ;￿;G0
X0jX which generate conditional
probabilities of agreement p0 2 [0;1]M observed in SSPE. We are interested in the probability for
agreements under two types of counterfactual environments: (a) the transition between observable
states is perturbed from G0
X0jX to G1
X0jX while ￿;~ c0;F0
￿ are ￿xed; or (b) the cake function is
changed to ~ c1(x) ￿ ~ c0(x)￿(x) (where ￿(x) 2 R1
++ denotes percentage changes in the (median) cake
size given state x), while G0
X0jX;F0
￿ remain the same. Suppose CI-1,2 hold, c(x;") = ~ c(x)￿" , and
￿ is ￿xed and known.
De￿nition 3 Given certain restrictions on unknown structure ~ c;F￿jX, the identi￿ed set of ratio-
nalizable counterfactual outcomes (ISRCO) consists of all conditional probabilities for agreement
p1 2 [0;1]M such that (p0;p1) are jointly rationalized by some ~ c;F￿jX that satis￿es the restrictions.
The next proposition introduces a simple, new algorithm that recovers ISRCO. The basic idea
extends the preceding lemma by synthesizing two linear systems characterizing rationalizability in
two bargaining environments respectively (one observed and one counterfactual). This synthesis
exploits the fact that the nuisance parameter F￿ is ￿xed under both contexts. The observed and
(unknown) counterfactual outcomes (p0;p1) enter the coe¢ cient matrix of the "synthesized" linear
system. Thus a ~ p 2 [0;1]M belongs to ISRCO if and only if the 2M-vector (p0; ~ p) makes the
synthesized linear system feasible with solutions in unknown parameters. The consistency of a
linear system can be checked through standard linear programming algorithms. For four 2M-
vectors (Qj;￿j)j=0;1, let ~ p01, ~ Q01, ~ ￿01 denote (2M + 1)-vectors that are de￿ned as [p0;p1;1=2],
[Q0;Q1;0], [￿0;￿1; ￿ ￿] respectively for some positive constant ￿ ￿. Let G1 denote the counterfactual
state transitions of interests in (a) above, and let ￿ denote a M-by-M diagonal matrix with the
m-th diagonal entry being ￿(xm) as in (b) above.
Proposition 5 Suppose the assumptions in Lemma 5 all hold. Then the ISRCO in (a) is the set21
of all p1 such that the following linear system holds for some (Qj;￿j)j=0;1:
Q0 + ￿(I ￿ ￿G0)￿1G0￿0 = Q1 + ￿(I ￿ ￿G1)￿1G1￿1 (12)
A
￿






n 8m;n 2 f1;:;Mg, j;k 2 f0;1g (14)
~ p01
(m)( ~ Q01
(m+1) ￿ ~ Q01
(m)) ￿ ~ ￿01
(m+1) ￿ ~ ￿01
(m) ￿ ~ p01
(m+1)( ~ Q01
(m+1) ￿ ~ Q01
(m)) for 1 ￿ m ￿ 2M (15)
Qj
m ￿ 0 , pj
m ￿ 1=2 ; ￿j
m > 0 8m;n 2 f1;:;Mg, j;k 2 f0;1g (16)
And the ISRCO in (b) is the set of all p1 such that a similar linear system (13)-(16) and (17) is
feasible with solutions (Qj;￿j)j=0;1, where (17) is de￿ned as
Q1 + ￿(I ￿ ￿G0)￿1G0￿1 = ￿
￿
Q0 + ￿(I ￿ ￿G0)￿1G0￿0￿
(17)
Thus recovering ISRCO amounts to collecting all p1 in [0;1]M such that [p0;p1] makes the linear
system feasible with solutions in fQj;￿jgj=0;1. Remarkably, this approach does not require any
parametric assumption on the cake function or the USV distribution. On the other hand, it fully
exploits the independence of ￿ and X and exogenously given shape restrictions "A ~ C > 0". By
construction, the ISRCO consists of all possible counterfactual outcomes that could be rationalized
under the model restrictions (i.e. dynamic rationality, independence of ￿ of X and A ~ C > 0).
We conclude this section by emphasizing that the ISRCO is interesting in its own right, re-
gardless of its size relative to the outcome space [0;1]M. This is because our approach e¢ ciently
exhausts all information about the counterfactuals that can be extracted from known restrictions
on the model. Thus the set reveals the limit of what can be learned about the probability for
agreements under counterfactual contexts, if econometricians choose to remain agnostic about the
functional form of the structural elements. In the next section, we illustrate the algorithm in a
simple numeric example. The ISRCO recovered there is small relative to the outcome space and
quite informative.
5.3 A simple numeric example
In this subsection, we use a simple numeric example to illustrate the consequence of normalizations
(locational and scale) and misspeci￿cations of the USV distributions on counterfactual analyses.
We also use the example to illustrate the algorithm proposed in Proposition 5 for recovering the
set of rationalizable counterfactual outcomes.
(Counterfactual outcomes when the true distribution of USV is uniform and known) Suppose
M = 3 and ￿ is independent of X with a true USV distribution F￿ that is uniform on [￿5;5].
Thus q(pk;F￿) = 10pk ￿ 5 and ￿(pk;F￿) = 5p2
k for pk 2 [0;1]. For any p = [p1;p2;p3] 2 [0;1]3, let22
Qunif(p);￿unif(p) denote R3-vectors with k-th coordinate being q(pk;F￿) and ￿(pk;F￿) respectively.
Let the discount rate ￿ be 4=5, and the observed transition G0 and the counterfactual transition




















(These speci￿cations are chosen randomly.) Suppose the true cake function (i.e. median cake sizes
conditional on observable states) is
~ Cunif = [ 717442573
165078240; 97368349
132062592; 330851369
264125184] t [4:3461; 0:7373; 1:2526]




16].13 A counterfactual outcome under G1 is a vector in [0;1]3 (denoted by p1
unif) with the
k-th coordinate being Pr(an agreement is reached jxk). The subscript is a reminder that the
counterfactual outcome is calculated using the assumed knowledge that the USV is uniform on
[￿5;5]. By de￿nition, p1
unif solves a system of quadratic equations
Qunif(p1
unif) + ￿(I ￿ ￿G1)￿1G1￿unif(p1
unif) = ~ Cunif (18)
The solution is found to be p1
unif t [0:5880 ; 0:2004 ; 0:2760].14
(Innocuous location and scale normalizations) Now suppose econometricians only know USV is
uniformly distributed, but mis-specify the support (scale and location) of ^ F￿ as [b ￿ a;b + a] for
some constants a 2 R1
+, b 2 R1 and a 6= 5, b 6= 0. Thus q(pk; ^ F￿) = b￿a+2apk and ￿(pk; ^ F￿) = ap2
k.
For any p 2 [0;1]3, let ^ Qunif(p); ^ ￿unif(p) denote vectors with k-th coordinate being q(pk; ^ F￿) and
￿(pk; ^ F￿) respectively (i.e. quantile and conditional surplus functions calculated based on the wrong
assumption ^ F￿). Then ~ C would be recovered (incorrectly) as
^ Cunif = ^ Qunif(p0) + ￿(I ￿ ￿G1)￿1G1^ ￿unif(p0) (19)
Straightforward substitutions show this misspeci￿cation still leads to the same system of nonlinear
equations in p1
unif as (18). In other words, even though Qunif(:), ￿unif(:) and ~ Cunif have di⁄erent
forms now due to the misspeci￿cation of F￿, the structure of the model is such that the di⁄erences
cancel out and yield the same system of nonlinear equations in (18). (See the Appendix for alge-
braic details.) This veri￿es our remarks earlier (following Lemma 4) that the scale and locational
normalizations of the USV distribution is innocuous for recovering counterfactuals.
13While choosing speci￿cations of the example, we actually let p






16] ￿rst, and then solve for
~ Cunif backwards by substituting p







0), where the functional forms
of Q
unif;￿
unif are de￿ned above.
14See the Appendix for analytical close forms of the system of nonlinear equations. We use the "fmincon" function
to solve for p
1
unif. The solution must be unique because given ~ c;F￿jX;GX0jX, the ex ante total continuation payo⁄
￿w is unique.23
(Consequence of misspecifying USV distributions) Suppose ￿;G0;G1 are still de￿ned as above,









with parameters ￿ = 0 (location), ￿ = 1 (scale), ￿ = 1 (shape). The distribution is positively
skewed with support bounded below at ￿1. For any p = [p1;p2;p3] 2 [0;1]3, let QGLL(p);￿GLL(p)
denote R3-vectors with the k-th coordinate being the quantile and conditional surplus functions at
pk, i.e.





pk )￿￿ ￿ 1
￿
￿(pk;F￿) ￿ qk + 1 ￿ log(qk + 2)
respectively. Thus the conditional median cake function is recovered (incorrectly) from the observed
p0 as follows:
~ CGLL = QGLL(p0) + ￿(I ￿ ￿G0)￿1G0￿GLL(p0)
Then the implied counterfactual outcome p1
GLL must solve
QGLL(p1
GLL) + ￿(I ￿ ￿G1)￿1G1￿GLL(p1
GLL) = ~ CGLL (20)
Solving (18) with the right-hand side given by ~ CGLL yields an implied counterfactuals p1
GLL t
[:5926;:1317;:2311], where the subscript GLL emphasizes this is the counterfactual outcome pre-
dicted under the misspeci￿cation of the USV in structural estimation.15 This implies misspecifying
USV to be a general log-logistic while the truth in the DGP is uniform is not innocuous, as it
induces discrepancies between the counterfactual outcomes it implies and the true counterfactual
outcomes.
(Robust identi￿cation of ISRCO without knowing the USV distribution) Now let the true ￿;G0
underlying the DGP be de￿ned as above, with F￿ uniform on [￿5;5] and the conditional median




16]. Econometricians do not know the USV distribution F￿ or the true ~ C. They
only observe p0 and know ￿;G0 in the DGP, and are interested in predicting the counterfactual
probabilities for agreements when the transition between states is changed to G1. Furthermore,
econometricians correctly learn from outside the model that the second state yields the lowest static
payo⁄, i.e. ~ c(x2) < minf~ c(x1);~ c(x3)g. Then the algorithm proposed above can be used to recover
the complete set of ISRCO by collecting all p1 2 [0;1]3 that make the linear system (12)-(16)
feasible. (See the Appendix for details in implementing the algorithm.) Figure 1 depicts the set of
ISRCO recovered is about 5:1% of the outcome space [0;1]3.
15We use a built-in command "fmincon" in Matlab to solve the system of nonlinear equations, which may have
multiple solutions in general. The solution reported here is robust to the choice of initial point for the algorithm.24
Figure 1: ISRCO with ￿ ? X, ~ c2 < min(~ c1;~ c3) and p0=[3/5,1/4,5/16]
Our algorithm for recovering ISRCO only requires ￿ to be independent of X. The ISRCO is
exhaustive and sharp in the following senses: (i) as long as the true USV distribution in the DGP
satis￿es this independence restriction and " ~ C2 < minf ~ C1; ~ C3g", the true counterfactual outcomes
under G1 must lie in ISRCO; and (ii) any outcome vector in ISRCO is a rationalizable counter-
factual outcomes corresponding to certain F￿ that satis￿es independence from X and ~ C such that
~ C2 < minf ~ C1; ~ C3g. Also note in implementing the algorithm we have invoked a location normal-
ization (Median(￿) = 0) and a scale normalization (￿(1=2;F￿) = ￿ ￿ > 0), which are known to be
innocuous for counterfactual analyses from Lemma 4 above.
6 Extensions
So far we have focused on a canonical stochastic bargaining model where players￿utilities are linear
in the surplus they receive, and all players share the same discount rate throughout the game.
Lemma 1 shows the payo⁄s in stationary subgame perfect equilibria is unique in such contexts.
This section studies the identi￿cation when players evaluate the surplus received according to a
concave utility function, or the discount rates are di⁄erent across players. In either of these two
cases, players￿payo⁄s from SSPE are no longer unique in general. We shall show the utility function
and the discount rates can be identi￿ed with complete data on the occurrence of agreements and
divisions of the cake under unanimous agreements, provided players across all bargaining games
observed in the DGP adopt strategies that yield the same pro￿le of SSPE payo⁄s (which are
functions of observable states).25
SE (Single equilibrium payo⁄ ) Players in all bargaining games observed follow stationary sub-
game perfect strategies that lead to the same pro￿le of SSPE payo⁄s (as functions of states).
This restriction is analogous to the "single-equilibrium" assumption used in the literature of
estimating discrete games of incomplete information in the presence of multiple Bayesian Nash
equilibria (e.g. Bajari, Hong, Krainer and Nekipelov (2008) and Tang (2009)). Such a "single-
SSPE-payo⁄" restriction allows econometricians to exploit the characterization of SSPE payo⁄s in
(5) and (6) to relate observable distributions to model primitives, without the need to specify which
SSPE payo⁄ is followed by players in the games observed.
6.1 Concave Utility Functions
In this subsection, we extend the basic model with complete information by relaxing restrictions of
transferable utilities. The set of feasible allocations is now given by C(s) = ft 2 RK :
P
i u￿1(ti) ￿
c(s) for some von-Neumann Morgenstern utility function u : R1
+ ! R1
+g. Econometricians observe
the cake sizes, the identity of the proposer, and the physical shares of the cake for each player when
a unanimous agreement occurs, but do not know the utility levels associated with these shares.
The lemma below characterizes the SSPE payo⁄s in this model.
Lemma 6 Suppose CI-1 holds. Then (a) v 2 FK is a SSPE payo⁄ in the bargaining game with
nontransferable utilities (NTU) if and only if A(v) = v where for all ~ s = (s;￿) 2 ￿~ S and for all i,






j6=i u￿1(￿E[vj(~ S0)jS = s])
￿
;￿E[vi(~ S0)jS = s]
o
, if ￿(1) = i
Ai(f)(~ s) ￿ ￿E[vi(~ S0)jS = s], if ￿(1) 6= i
(b) For any SSPE payo⁄ v 2 FK, a unanimous agreement occurs in state s when the proposer is i





j6=i u￿1(￿E[vj(~ S0)jS = s])
￿
￿ ￿E[vi(~ S0)jS = s] (21)
When an agreement occurs, the o⁄er made to a non-proposer j is u￿1(￿E[vj(~ S0)jS = s]), and
player j accepts if and only if the share o⁄ered is greater than u￿1(￿E[vj(~ S0)jS = s]).
The proof follows from Theorem 1 in Merlo and Wilson (1995) and uses conditions in CI-1 to
show the ex ante individual SSPE continuation payo⁄s are independent from the order of moves in
the current period, i.e. E[vi(~ S0)j~ S] = E[vi(~ S0)jS]. Identi￿cation of the utility function is possible
if we exploit observations of the division of cakes observed, and if the utility function is restricted
to belong to a particular class of utility functions.
PA (Possibility of agreement) For all x 2 ￿X and ￿ ￿ ￿(1) 2 f1;2;:;Kg, Pr(D = 1jx;￿) > 0.26
PS (Parameter space) The parameter space for utility function (denoted ￿U) is such that (i)
u0 > 0, u(0) = 0 for all u 2 ￿U; and (ii) for all u; ~ u 2 ￿U, ~ u = g ￿ u where g is a strictly concave
or convex function (possibly depending on u; ~ u).
Assumption PA ensures that for all values of x there is positive probability of reaching an
immediate agreement. This is important, as the link between utilities and physical shares exists
only when a unanimous agreement occurs. Assumption PS allows us to use Jensen￿ s inequality
repeatedly to prove by contradiction that the observational equivalence of two utility functions u; ~ u
fails under the assumptions above.




A corollary of the proposition is that u is identi￿ed within the classes of increasing functions
with either constant absolute risk aversions (CARA) or constant relative risk aversions (CRRA)
respectively and u(0) = 0. To see this, suppose u1;u2 are both di⁄erentiable CARA functions
with u2 = g ￿ u1. Let Ra(h) ￿ ￿
h00(x)
h0(x) denote the absolute risk aversion for a function h. Then
algebra shows Ra(g) = Ra(u2)￿Ra(u1). Both Ra(u2) and Ra(u1) are constant by our supposition,
and g0 > 0 by condition (i) in PS. Hence g00 must be either strictly positive or strictly negative
over its whole support. It follows the class of increasing CARA functions with u(0) = 0 satis￿es
PS. Likewise, we can also show u is identi￿ed within the class of increasing CRRA functions with
u(0) = 0.
6.2 Heterogenous Discount Factors
Now consider another extension where each player i in the bargaining game has a di⁄erent discount
factor ￿i. The lemma below characterizes the SSPE payo⁄s in this case.
Lemma 7 Suppose CI-1 holds. Then f 2 FK is a SSPE payo⁄ if and only if A(f) = f where for
all (s;￿) 2 ￿S;￿,
Ai(f)(s;￿) ￿ maxfc(s) ￿ E[
P
j6=i ￿jfj(S0;￿0)jS = s] ; ￿iE[fi(S0;￿0)jS = s]g, if ￿(1) = i
Aj(f)(s;￿) ￿ ￿jE[fj(S0;￿0)jS = s], if ￿(1) 6= j
The proof of this lemma follows from similar arguments in Theorem 1 in Merlo and Wilson
(1998), and is omitted for brevity. With heterogenous discount factors, additional information
from observed divisions of cakes under agreements must be exploited to recover individual ￿i.27
Theory predicts in any SSPE, a non-proposer always receives a share that is equal to his individual
ex ante continuation payo⁄ when an agreement is reached. Analogous to Lemma 3, the basic idea
underlying the identi￿cation of individual ￿i is to show there exists a strictly monotone mapping
between individual discount rates and observed shares for a non-proposer, once the observable
distributions of (Y;D;X) are controlled for.
Proposition 7 Under CI-1,2,3, SE, MT and PA, the discount factors f￿igK
i=1 are identi￿ed.
As before, MT ensures there exists a one-to-one mapping between Y and ￿. PA ensures that
for any i, his share of the cake when an agreement is reached under someone else￿ s proposal can be
observed as a function of x. SE ensures the observable distribution of (Y;D) is rationalized by a
single SSPE, rather than a mixture of distributions rationalized in each of the multiple SSPE due
to heterogenous ￿i. Then the probability of agreements and agreed shares of the cake can still be
related to discount rates as theory predicts in Lemma 7.16
Lemma 3 and Proposition 7 di⁄er in that the former only uses the distribution of total cake sizes
and the probability of unanimous agreements while the latter also exploits actual allocations under
agreement. This di⁄erence comports with the intuition that when discount rates are heterogenous
among players, econometricians need to exploit more information from observables to identify the
vector of individual ￿i￿ s. In fact, the homogenous ￿ in Lemma 3 is over-identi￿ed in the sense that
observing the total cake size alone is su¢ cient for identifying the single ￿, while econometricians
get to observe a K-vector of agreed non-proposer shares conditional on X. Each coordinate in the
K-vector contains enough information for identifying ￿.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we present positive results in the identi￿cation of structural elements and counterfac-
tual outcomes in stochastic sequential bargaining models under various scenarios of data availability.
A unifying theme throughout the paper is that, in the absence of parametric assumptions on model
structures, the model and its counterfactuals can still be point- or informatively partially-identi￿ed
under fairly weak nonparametric restrictions (such as shape restrictions on the cake function or
stochastic restrictions on the unobservable states), depending on data availability.
We conclude by mentioning some interesting directions for future research. First, in this paper,
we have not addressed the de￿nition of estimators or their asymptotic properties. Second, our
16SE implies there should be no variation in the size of shares for a ￿xed non-proposer and x. This testable
implication can be easily veri￿ed by observed data.28
point of departure in this paper is a group of conditional independence restrictions CI-1,2,3. Under
these assumptions and conditional on current observable states, the cake sizes are independent of
histories of states, and the order of moves in each period reveals no information about unobserved
states or cake sizes. These assumptions are instrumental to our discussion of identi￿cation, but
also imply speci￿c restrictions on observable distributions.17 Directions for future research includes
identi￿cation when these conditional independence restrictions are relaxed, so that cake sizes or
the agreed allocations are allowed to be correlated with the order of moves given states observed.
8 Appendix:
8.1 Part A: Proofs of Lemmas and Propositions
Proof of Lemma 1. It follows from Theorem 1 in Merlo and Wilson (1998) that the individual
SSPE payo⁄ is characterized by
Ai(f)(s;￿) ￿ maxfc(s) ￿ ￿E[
P
j6=i fj(~ S0)j~ S = (s;￿)] ; ￿E[fi(~ S0)j~ S = (s;￿)]g, if ￿(1) = i
Aj(f)(s;￿) ￿ ￿E[fj(~ S0)j~ S = (s;￿)], if ￿(1) 6= j
and from Theorem 2 in Merlo and Wilson (1998) that the total SSPE payo⁄ must satisfy the ￿xed
point equation w(s;￿) = maxfc(s) ; ￿E[w(~ S0)j~ S = (s;￿)]g for all ~ s = (s;￿), and that agreement
occurs for ~ s if and only if c(s) ￿ ￿E[w(~ S0)j~ S = (s;￿)]. Note under CI-1, for any function h of
(S;￿),
E[h(~ S0)j~ S = (s;￿)]
=
Z






E[h(S0;￿0)js0]dHS0jS(s0js) = E[h(~ S0)jS = s]
where the ￿rst equality follows from the law of total probability, the second follows from condition
(i) in CI-1, and the third follows from condition (ii) in CI-1. Then (a), (b) and (c) in the lemma
follows. The uniqueness of SSPE payo⁄s is shown Theorem 3 in Merlo and Wilson (1998). ￿
17For example, under CI-1,2,3, the ex ante individual continuation payo⁄s ￿i in SSPE must be independent of
￿;￿ given X in the canonical model. This implies whenever an agreement occurs with i being proposer and with a
￿xed x realized, the player i must always proposes the same pro￿le of shares to each of the other players. This limits
the model￿ s applicability in contexts where we do observe variations in proposals made by certain player to his rivals
conditional on x.29
Proof of Lemma 2. Part (a): That players must exhaust the complete cake under agreements in
SSPE is trivial. Under CI-1,2, FSt+1;￿t+1jXt;￿t = ~ L￿t+1jSt+1FSt+1jXt;￿t = ~ L￿t+1jSt+1FSt+1jXt, where
the ￿rst equality follows from the ￿rst condition in CI-1 and the second follows from the sec-
ond condition in CI-1 and both conditions in CI-2.18 Note Yt is determined by St only and, due
to the "separation principle", Dt is also determined by St alone in SSPE. Therefore in SSPE,
(Yt+1;Dt+1;Xt+1;￿t+1) is determined by (￿t+1;Xt+1;￿t+1) and must be jointly independent of
(￿t;Xt￿1) conditional on Xt, and FYt+1;Dt+1;￿t+1;Xt+1jXt;￿t = FYt+1;Dt+1;￿t+1jXt+1;XtGXt+1jXt. But
note F￿t+1;￿t+1jXt+1;Xt = ~ L￿t+1jSt+1F￿t+1jXt+1 under CI-1,2. Hence (Yt+1;Dt+1;￿t+1) must be inde-
pendent of Xt given Xt+1, and (2) holds under SSPE. To show (3), it su¢ ces to note the division
of the cake under a unanimous agreement ￿t+1 is completely determined by St+1, ￿t+1 and the pa-
rameters in ￿. (In fact only the identity of the proposer ￿t+1;(1) matters.) The time-homogeneity of
FYt;Dt;￿tjXt and F￿t;￿tjDt=1;Xt follows from the time-homogeneity of ~ L￿jS and HS0jS = F￿0jX0GX0jX,
which we maintain throughout the paper.
Part (b): Given that the initial distribution of X0 is identi￿ed, any ￿;￿0 that generate the same
F￿;DjX, F￿jD=1;X;￿ must also by de￿nition generate the same joint distribution of observables with
￿ = 0. Now consider the case ￿ = 1. Then
Pr(D0 = 0;D1 = 1;￿0;￿1;Y0;X1;￿1jX0)
= Pr(D1 = 1;￿1;￿1jX1;D0 = 0;X0;Y0;￿0)Pr(X1jD0 = 0;Y0;￿0;X0)Pr(D0 = 0;Y0;￿0jX0)
= Pr(D1 = 1;￿1;￿1jX1)G(X1jX0)Pr(D0 = 0;Y0;￿0jX0)
where the second equality follows from CI-1,2 again. Recall GX0jX is directly recovered from
observables, and by our supposition, ￿;￿0 generate the same conditional distributions F￿1;D1;￿1jX1
and FY0;D0;￿0jX0. Hence ￿;￿0 induce the same joint distribution of observables with ￿ = 1. We then
complete the proof through induction. Suppose ￿;￿0 generate the same observable distribution for
￿ ￿ t. Now consider the distribution with ￿ = t + 1,
Pr(
Qt
s=0 Ds = 0;Dt+1 = 1;￿t+1;Y t;Xt+1;￿t+1jX0)
= Pr(Dt+1 = 1;￿t+1;￿t+1jXt+1;
Qt
s=0 Ds = 0;￿t;Y t;Xt)Pr(Xt+1j
Qt
s=0 Ds = 0;￿t;Y t;Xt) ￿
Pr(
Qt
s=0 Ds = 0;￿t;Y t;XtjX0)
= Pr(Dt+1 = 1;￿t+1;￿t+1jXt+1)G(Xt+1jXt)Pr(
Qt
s=0 Ds = 0;￿t;Y t;XtjX0)
under CI-1,2. By our supposition at the beginning of this induction step, ￿;￿0 generate the same
￿rst and last terms in the product. ￿
Proof of Lemma 3. Note Pr(D = 1jx) = PrfY ￿ ￿￿w(x)jxg = 1 ￿ FY jX(￿￿w(x)), where ￿w(s) ￿
E[w(S0)jS = s] is the ex ante total continuation payo⁄ for all players in SSPE, which obviously
18Note under the second condition in CI-1, FSt+1jXt;￿t;Xt￿1;￿t = HSt+1jSt. Then note under CI-2, HSt+1jSt =
F￿t+1jXt+1GXt+1jXt. Hence St+1 is independent of f￿t;X
t￿1;￿
tg conditional on Xt30
depends on structural elements (￿;c;F￿jX;GX0jX). Under CI-1,2, ￿w must be a function of X only.











But note ￿￿w(x) = F￿1
Y jX=x(1 ￿ p(x)) in SSPE since FY jX=x is strictly increasing for all x due to
MT. Hence the function ￿ can be expressed in terms of observable distributions as





Y jX=x(1 ￿ p(x))dFY jX=x(y)
This in turn implies the true ￿w(x) can be alternatively represented as a solution to the following
"quasi-structural" ￿xed-point equation: f = T(f;￿;p;FY jX), where
T(f;￿;p;FY jX) ￿
Z
￿f(x0) + ~ ￿(x0;p;FY jX)dG(x0jx) (24)
The "quasi-" pre￿x is intended to highlight that structural elements (￿;c;F￿jX;GX0X) all enter
(24) indirectly through observed p, FY jX. It is easy to see that with ~ ￿ bounded and continuous, (i)
T(f + c) ￿ Tf + ￿c for ￿ < 1 and all c 2 R1
++; and (ii) f1 ￿ f2 implies T(f1) ￿ T(f2). Hence the
operator T is a contraction mapping when ￿ < 1 with ~ ￿. More generally, let ^ ￿w denote the unique
solution for ^ ￿w = T(^ ￿w; ^ ￿;p;FY jX), with p;FY jX being observed from the data generating process
(DGP) but ^ ￿ being any generic discount rate. That is, ^ ￿ may be any element in (0;1) that di⁄ers
from the true discount rate ￿. Recursive substitutions of (24) show that ^ ￿w(x; ^ ￿;p;FY jX) must
be strictly increasing in ^ ￿ with p;FY jX ￿xed from data observed.19 Hence ^ ￿^ ￿w(x; ^ ￿;p;FY jX) must
also be strictly increasing in ^ ￿ for all x. It then follows that the true discount rate ￿ is identi￿ed
as
inff^ ￿ : ^ ￿^ ￿w(x; ^ ￿;p;FY jX) ￿ F￿1
Y jX(1 ￿ p(x))g
where we have also used the fact that FY jX is strictly increasing in y for all x under MT. ￿
19To see this, note (24) can be written as





0)dGX0jX and If = f for bounded continuous f. That I ￿ ^ ￿G is invertible follows from the fact













and ^ ￿w must be increasing in ^ ￿ with ~ ￿ ￿xed from observable distributions and known to be positive by de￿nition.31
Proof of Proposition 1. Necessity follows from the de￿nition of observational equivalence. For su¢ -
ciency, results from Lemma 2 suggests it su¢ ces to show FY;DjX(￿) = FY;DjX(￿0) and F￿jD=1;X;￿(￿) =
F￿jD=1;X;￿(￿0) a.e. on ￿X if FY jX(￿) = FY jX(￿0) a.e. on ￿X. (Recall ￿ is independent of ￿ condi-
tional on X, and L￿jX is directly identi￿ed from data.) Let ￿ ￿ (￿1;:;￿K) denote the vector of ex
ante continuation payo⁄s for players (1;:;K) in SSPE by





E(vi(~ S0)j~ S0 2 ~ S(￿);￿0 = i;s;￿)Pr(~ S0 2 ~ S(￿);￿0 = ijs;￿)+
E(vi(~ S0)j~ S0 62 ~ S(￿);￿0 = i;s;￿)Pr(~ S0 62 ~ S(￿);￿0 = ijs;￿)+





where vi is player i￿ s SSPE payo⁄ (with its dependence on ￿ suppressed for notational ease), ￿0 is
the identity of the proposer in the next period and ~ S(￿) denotes the subset of ￿S;￿ such that c(s) ￿
￿
P
i ￿i(s;￿). Our proof of su¢ ciency uses Lemma A1 below.
Lemma A1: Suppose CI-1,2,3 hold. Then (i) the vector of ex ante continuation payo⁄ in SSPE
￿ is independent of unobserved states ￿ and the order of moves ￿ given x (i.e. ￿(s;￿;￿) = ￿(x;￿))
for all s 2 ￿S and any ￿; (ii) for any ￿;￿0 such that FY jX(￿) = FY jX(￿0) a.e. on ￿X, ￿(x;￿) =
￿(x;￿0) a.e. on ￿X.
Proof: To prove (i), note ￿ is the solution to the ￿xed point equation ￿ = ￿(￿;￿), where the
















E[￿￿i(~ S0)1(~ S0 62 ~ S(￿);￿0 = i)js;￿] + E(￿￿i(~ S0)1(￿0 6= i)js;￿)
)
(26)
where 1(￿) is an indicator function that is equal to 1 if and only if the event ￿ is true. Under










Hence ￿ only maps into the space of functions that are independent of ￿ and the order of moves ￿
conditional on x. The usual ￿xed point arguments show solutions to ￿ = ￿(￿;￿) exist and must
be independent of ￿ given x (i.e. ￿ must be a function of x but does not involve ￿ or ￿).
To prove (ii), let qi(x) ￿ Pr(￿ = ijx) (which is directly identi￿ed from observables) and note

































































































where the ￿rst equality follows from CI-1,2 as above and the second from CI-3. Finally,




Hence given any ￿ and with GX0jX;L￿jX (and therefore fqi(:)gk
i=1) directly recovered from observ-
ables in data, the ex ante continuation payo⁄s ￿ depend on c and F￿jX only through FY jX, as is
seen in the derivation of the ￿xed point equation ￿ = ￿(￿;￿;GX0jX;FY jX;L￿jX) above. Therefore
for any pair ￿;￿0 such that FY jX(￿) = FY jX(￿0) a.e. on ￿X, we have
￿(x;￿) = ￿(x;￿0)
a.e. on ￿X. This completes the proof of Lemma A1. Q.E.D.
Recall for any y 2 R1
+, X = x,
Pr(D = 1jY ￿ y;X = x)
= Pr(Y ￿ ￿
PK
j=1 ￿j(X;￿;GX0jX;FY jX;L￿jX)jY ￿ y;X = x)
Hence this conditional probability of reaching an agreement is a functional of (￿;GX0jX;FY jX;L￿jX)
only. Therefore for any ￿;￿0 such that FY jX(￿) = FY jX(￿0) a.e. on ￿X, we also have FY;DjX(￿) =
FY;DjX(￿0) a.e. on ￿X. It only remains to show F￿;Y jD=1;X;￿(￿) = F￿;Y jD=1;X;￿(￿0) a.e. on ￿X.
But whenever agreements occur, the proposer i o⁄ers ￿E[vj(S0)jS = s] ￿ ￿￿j(x) to others, while
claiming c(s) ￿ ￿
P
j6=i ￿j(x) to himself. Therefore by Lemma A1, for any ￿xed x and with L￿jX
observed directly from data, the joint distribution of the cake size and agreed allocations to all
players are the same for any ￿ and ￿0 such that FY jX(￿) = FY jX(￿0) a.e. on ￿X. ￿33
Proof of Proposition 2. That ￿ is identi￿ed follows from Lemma 3 and the fact that AS, MH
implies CI-2, MT. Since MH implies conditional independence of ￿ from histories given X, we have
￿w(s) ￿ E[w(S0)jS = s] = E[w(S0)jx] =
Z
~ w(x0)dG(x0jx) (27)
where ~ w(x) ￿ E[w(S)jX = x]. Note GX0jX is directly recovered from observables. With knowledge
of ￿, ~ w(x) can also be identi￿ed from data as E[￿￿ P
i ￿￿;ijX = x], where ￿ denotes the number
of periods it takes to reach an agreement after state x is realized, and ￿￿;i = vi(s￿;￿￿) denotes
the proposed allocation for player i accepted in state s￿. Note
P
i vi(s;￿) = c(s) when agreement
occurs under (s;￿), since agreed proposals always exhaust the cake size. Therefore the right-hand
side of (27) is identi￿ed.
Since cake sizes are not reported when proposals are rejected, only censored values of c(s),
denoted as y = maxf￿E[ ~ w(X0)jX = x];c(s)g, is observed. Then the gains to the proposer in SSPE
is:
y￿ ￿ y ￿ ￿E[ ~ w(X0)jX = x]
= maxf~ c(x) ￿ ￿E[ ~ w(X0)jX = x] + ";0g
Note ￿w(s) is a function of x but not " under CI-1 and MH. Therefore the ex ante total continuation
payo⁄ ￿w is the unique ￿xed point of a contraction mapping
￿w(x) =
Z
maxf~ c(x0) + "0;￿￿w(x0)gdF￿jX("0jx0)dG(x0jx)
And it maps from the space of continuous, bounded functions to itself. Hence ￿w must also be
continuous and bounded over ￿X, and so is ￿. The rest of proof of identi￿cation follows from Chen
and Khan (2005), which relies on SG. To see SG is testable using observed distributions, note the
event "￿(x) > 0" is equivalent to "Prf￿ > ￿￿(x)jxg > 1
2" since Median(￿jx) = 0 for all x 2 ￿X.
Hence SG is equivalent to PrfPr(D = 1jX) > 1
2g > 0. ￿
Proof of Proposition 3. Let q￿(Y ￿jx) denote the ￿-th quantile of Y ￿ given x. For x 2 ￿+
X, ￿(x) =
q1=2(Y ￿jx) is identi￿ed. Consider any x = (x0;x1) s.t. x 62 ￿+
X. By RG and RS, ￿ is bounded
over ￿X while support of unobservable states ￿￿ given x0 is unbounded. Then 9￿ ￿ > 1=2 and close
enough to 1 s.t. q￿ ￿(Y ￿jx) = ￿(x) + c￿ ￿(x) > 0 is observed, where c￿ ￿(x) = c￿ ￿(x0) denotes the ￿ ￿-th
quantile of ￿ conditional on x ￿ (x0;x1), and is independent of x1 by ER. Now pick ~ x = (x0; ~ x1)
such that q1=2(Y ￿j~ x) = ￿(~ x) > 0 is observable. Such a choice is possible because of SG2. Hence
￿(~ x) is identi￿ed. Since ￿ ￿ > 1=2 and c￿ ￿(x) = c￿ ￿(~ x) under ER, q￿ ￿(Y ￿j~ x) must also be positive,
observable, and equal to ￿(~ x)+ c￿ ￿(x0). Hence (with a slight abuse of notation) c￿ ￿(x0) = c￿ ￿(~ x) is
recovered as q￿ ￿(Y ￿j~ x)￿ ￿(~ x). This implies ￿(x) can then be recovered as q￿ ￿(Y ￿jx) ￿ c￿ a(~ x) for any
x 62 ￿X. ￿34
Proof of Lemma 4. Suppose the model is correctly speci￿ed for some (~ c1(x);F1
￿jX). Consider an
alternative speci￿cation (~ c2(x);F2
￿jX) where ~ c2(x) = a~ c1(x) + b and F2
￿jX(t) = F1
￿jX(t￿b
a ) for some
constants a > 0 and b. Lemma 1 showed total payo⁄ w in SSPE must satisfy: w(s) = maxfc(s);
￿E[w(S0)js]g and an agreement is reached in state s if and only if c(s) ￿ ￿E[w(S0)js]. Let ￿w(s) ￿
P




Under our supposition of the model speci￿cation c(s) = ~ c1(x) ￿ " and F1
￿jX, this suggests SSPE




maxf~ c1(x0) ￿ "0;￿f(x0)gdF1
￿jX("0jx0)dG(x0jx)
Some algebra using change-of-variables shows the ￿xed point solutions under the alternative spec-
i￿cation (~ c2;F2
￿jX) is ￿w;2(x) = a￿w;1(x). Therefore
Pr(D = 1jx;~ c2;F2
￿jX) = F2
￿jX(~ c2(x)￿￿￿w;2(x)jx) = F1
￿jX(~ c1(x)￿￿￿w;1(x)jx) = Pr(D = 1jx;~ c1;F1
￿jX)
￿
Proof of Proposition 4. To prove (i), ￿rst recall by Lemma 1, the total SSPE payo⁄ w must
satisfy: w(s) = maxfc(s); ￿E[w(S0)js]g and an agreement is reached in state s if and only if
c(s) ￿ ￿E[w(S0)js]. Let ￿w(s) ￿
P
i ￿i(s) = E[w(S0)js] as before. By conditional independence,




Under AS, c(s) = ~ c(x) ￿ ", and the formula can be written as
￿w(x) ￿
Z





maxf~ c(x0) ￿ ￿￿w(x0) ￿ "0;0gdF￿jX("0jx0)dG(x0jx)
De￿ne p(x) ￿ Pr(D = 1jx) = Pr(c(S) ￿ ￿￿w(X)jx) = F￿jX=x(~ c(x) ￿ ￿￿w(x)). Hence ~ c(x) ￿
￿￿w(x) = F￿1








￿￿w(x0) + ￿(x0;p;F￿jX)dG(x0jx) (28)
For any given F￿jX and p observed, the right hand side of (28) is a contraction mapping by standard
arguments in the BS Theorem. Therefore with knowledge of F￿jX, p and G, ￿w is uniquely recovered35
as the solution to the ￿xed point equation in (28). Hence ~ c is identi￿ed with knowledge of F￿jX.
The proof of (ii) follows almost immediately. When ￿ is unknown, ￿w can be written as a monotone
function of ￿. We can solve the following equation given knowledge of F￿jX, p and ~ c(￿ x),
￿￿w(￿ x;￿) = ~ c(￿ x) ￿ F￿1
￿jX=￿ x(p(￿ x))
It then follows from the proof of (ii) that with knowledge of ￿, the component in cake function ~ c
can be identi￿ed. ￿
Proof of Lemma 5. (Necessity) Suppose a vector p is generated by some true parameters (~ c;F￿)
underlying the DGP such that A ~ C > 0 and ￿ is independent of X with median 0. Then let
~ Qm = F￿1
￿ (pm) and ~ ￿m = ￿(p(xm);F￿). It follows immediately from the substitution of (6) into
(5), the independence of ￿ from X and the monotonicity of F￿ that (7) and (8) must hold for ~ Q; ~ ￿.
The de￿nition of ￿ and some straightforward algebra (involving the Leibniz rule for di⁄erentiating
integrals) suggest for any m;n,




which must be bounded between pn( ~ Qm ￿ ~ Qn) and pm( ~ Qm ￿ ~ Qn). Hence (9) holds for ~ Q; ~ ￿.
Note (11) holds for ~ ￿ by de￿nition of the CSF ￿, and (10) holds for ~ Q; ~ ￿ if ￿ ￿ is equal to the
true CSF at 1
2, i.e. ~ ￿ ￿ ￿(1=2;F￿). More generally, if ￿ ￿ 6= ~ ￿, the system (7)-(11) still holds
for the scale multiplications (￿ ￿=~ ￿) ~ Q and (￿ ￿=~ ￿)~ ￿. (Su¢ ciency) We need to show that if (7)-(11)
holds for some Q;￿ then there must be a pair (~ c;F￿) such that (i) ￿ is independent of X and ~ c
satis￿es the shape restrictions; and (ii) (~ c;F￿) generates p as the decision maker￿ s dynamic rational
choice probabilities. By supposition the linear system is feasible. Hence we can ￿nd such a F￿ by
choosing the pm-percentile F￿1
￿ (pm) to be the solutions Qm and choosing ￿(p(xm)) by ￿rst setting
￿(1=2) = ￿ ￿ and then interpolating between F￿1
￿ (pm) so that ￿(p(xm)) is equal to the solution
￿m. This is possible because the inequality restrictions (9) and (10) are satis￿ed. A distribution
constructed this way naturally satis￿es the independence of X and Median(￿) = 0 due to the
de￿nition of the linear system (7)-(11). Then de￿ne ~ C = Q + ￿(I ￿ ￿G)￿1G￿ and the pair (~ c;F￿)
satis￿es both requirements (i) and (ii) above. ￿
Proof of Proposition 5. The distribution of unobservable states F0
￿ is ￿xed in both the observed
and the counterfactual environments. It su¢ ces to note that in type (a) counterfactual exercise,
~ C = Qj + ￿(I ￿ ￿Gj)￿1Gj￿j for j = 0;1. And in type (b) counterfactual exercise, ~ C = Q0 +
￿(I ￿￿G0)￿1G0￿0 while ￿ ~ C = Q1+￿(I ￿￿G1)￿1G1￿1. The rest of the proof follows from similar
arguments in Lemma 5 and is omitted for brevity. ￿
Proof of Proposition 6. For any player i, let vi(s;￿) denote his SSPE payo⁄s conditional on s;￿.36
The ex ante individual continuation payo⁄ for i in SSPE is:
￿i(s;￿) ￿ E[vi(~ S0)j~ S = (s;￿)] (29)
=
(
E[vi(S0;￿0)1(D0 = 1;￿0 = i)js;￿]+
E[vi(S0;￿0)1(D0 = 0;￿0 = i)js;￿] + E[vi(S0;￿0)1(￿0 6= i)js;￿]
)
where Dt is the dummy for an agreement in period t and it is a function of St but not ￿t. Under
CI-1,2,
F(S0;￿0jS;￿) = ~ L(￿0jS0)F(￿0jX0)G(X0jX)
That is, S0;￿0 are independent of ￿;￿ conditional on X. Therefore ￿ is a function of X only. Hence





























































where the ￿rst equality follows from the law of iterated expectations and the second equality follows
from the fact that under CI-1,2,3:
F￿0;￿0jX0;X = F￿0jS0;XF￿0jX0;X = F￿0jX0F￿0jX0








































Likewise, the second term can be written as
Z





















Hence we can write ￿ = ￿(￿;u;￿;GX0jX;FY jX) where ￿ is a Rk-valued function with the i-th












For notational ease, we suppress dependence of the ￿xed point equation on (￿;GX0jX;FY jX).
De￿ne the physical share of the cake for a non-proposer i when an agreement occurs in state x as
 i(x) = u￿1(￿￿i(x)). The assumption PA implies that for each individual i and observable state
x, there is positive probability that an agreement is reached when i is not the proposer. Hence
for each player i,  i(x) is observed over the support ￿X as the physical shares for player i when
agreements occur and ￿ 6= i in state s = (x;").
De￿ne y￿
i ￿ y ￿
P





qi(x0)p0(x0) + 1 ￿ qi(x0)
￿
￿￿i(x0)dG(x0jx) (31)





i jX;D=1(tjx) = E[u(Y ￿
i )jD = 1;x]
We refer to (31) as a "quasi-￿xed-point equation" for ￿￿i(x). Compared with (30), (31) di⁄ers in
that it explicitly expresses how f igk
i=1, p1 and FY ￿jX;D=1 enter the ￿xed point equation. Though
dependent upon the unknown true utility function u, these three functions are observable from
data and therefore are held ￿xed in identi￿cation arguments.
We prove by contradiction. Suppose there exists u 6= ~ u in ￿U and u
o:e:
~ ~ u. Let ￿; ~ ￿ denote
solutions to ￿xed point equations corresponding to u; ~ u respectively
￿ = ￿(￿;u) ; ~ ￿ = ￿(~ ￿; ~ u)
By supposition of observational equivalence of u and ~ u, we have for all i and almost everywhere on
￿X,
 i(x;u) ￿ u￿1(￿￿i(x;u)) = ~ u￿1(￿~ ￿i(x; ~ u)) ￿  i(x; ~ u) (32)
p1(x;u) ￿ Pr(D = 1jx;u) = Pr(D = 1jx; ~ u) ￿ p1(x; ~ u) (33)38
It follows that for the distribution of cake size FY jX observed, the same conditional distribution
FY ￿jX;D is induced by both u; ~ u. Suppose ~ u = g￿u for some strictly concave function g : R1
+ ! R1
+.
Then ￿ ￿i(x; ~ u) = ￿ ￿i(x;g ￿ u) < g ￿ ￿ ￿i(x;u) by concavity of g and the Jensen￿ s Inequality. Also note
 i(x;u) = u￿1(￿￿i(x;u)). Therefore for u
o:e:
~ ~ u,
~ u( i(x; ~ u))
= ￿
Z
qi(x0)p1(x0; ~ u)￿ ￿i(x0; ~ u) +
￿
qi(x0)p0(x0; ~ u) + 1 ￿ qi(x0)
￿
~ u( i(x0; ~ u))dG(x0jx)
< ￿
Z
qi(x0)p1(x0;u)g ￿ ￿ ￿i(x0;u) +
￿
qi(x0)p0(x0;u) + 1 ￿ qi(x0)
￿






























= g ￿ u( i(x;u)) = ~ u( i(x;u)) = ~ u( i(x; ~ u))
where the inequalities all follow from concavity of g and applications of Jensen￿ s Inequality as well
as (32) and (33). In addition, the last inequality also uses g(0) = 0 (implied by u(0) = 0 for all
u 2 ￿U). This constitutes a contraction. The proof for the case with ~ u = h ￿ u for some strictly
convex function h follows from symmetric arguments and is omitted for brevity. Hence / 9u 6= ~ u in
￿u such that u
o:e:
~ ~ u. ￿
Proof of Proposition 7. Let
￿ !
R denote a generic vector in RK, with the i-th coordinate Ri
corresponding to player i. Let ￿ ! v ￿ (vj)K
j=1 be the vector of individual SSPE payo⁄s that solve the
￿xed-point equation in Lemma 7. Note under CI-1,2,
E[vi(S0;￿0)jS = (x;")] = E[vi(S0;￿0)jX = x]
Under PA, for all i, there is positive probability that i is not the proposer and an agreement is
reached. This implies for all i and x, the discounted individual ex ante continuation payo⁄￿i￿i(x) ￿
￿iE[vi(S0;￿0)jX = x] can be observed as  i(x), i.e. the physical division of the cake received by i
when i is not the proposer and an agreement is reached under x. By de￿nition,
￿i(x) ￿
Z  
E[vi(S0;￿0)j￿0 = i;x0]Pr(￿0 = ijx0)+

















with ￿0 being the identity of the proposer in the next period, qi(x) ￿ Pr(￿ = ijx), and the second
equality following from Lemma 7. Hence (34) implies ￿ ! ￿ solves the structural ￿xed-point equation39
￿ ! ￿ = T(￿ ! ￿ ;
￿ !













This in turn implies under MT, ￿i(x) can be alternatively represented as the solution to the following
"quasi-structural" ￿xed-point equation: ￿i = ~ T(￿i;￿i;
￿ !
 ;FY jX;L￿jX), where
~ T(fi;￿i;
￿ !
 ;FY jX;L￿jX) =
Z









j=1  j(x);0gdFY jX=x(y). It is easy to show that,
with
￿ !
 ;FY jX;L￿jX observed and ￿xed from data, the "quasi-structural" mapping ~ T is a con-
traction for any generic ^ ￿i 2 (0;1). Let ^ ￿i denote the solution ^ ￿i = ~ T(^ ￿i; ^ ￿i;
￿ !
 ;FY jX) for a
generic ^ ￿i. Arguments similar to Lemma 3 show that, with ~ ￿i positive for all i;x by de￿nition,
^ ￿i^ ￿i(x; ^ ￿i;
￿ !
 ;FY jX;L￿jX) must be strictly increasing in ^ ￿i for all x. Therefore a true individual
discount rate ￿i is identi￿ed as
inff^ ￿i : ^ ￿i^ ￿i(x; ^ ￿i;
￿ !
 ;FY jX;L￿jX) ￿  i(x)g
This completes the proof for all i. ￿
8.2 Part B: Details of the example in Section 5.3
(Counterfactual outcomes when the true distribution of USV is uniform and known) The closed























3 + 10p3 ￿ 5 = 330851369
264125184
(Innocuous location and scale normalizations) For example, suppose a = 3;b = 2. Then the























3 + 6p3 ￿ 1 = 1211268649
440208640
which is the same system as (36). Such an equivalence holds for all a 6= 5 and b 6= 0 in general.40
(Robust identi￿cation of ISRCO without knowing the USV distribution) For any candidate coun-
terfactual p1 considered and the actual p0 observed in the DGP, rewrite the linear system (12)-(16)
as :
MIV > 0 (37)
MEV = d (38)
where V ￿ [Q0;Q1;￿0;￿1] is the vector of unknown distributional parameters from F￿. Then
substitute out a subvector of V in (37) using the equalities in (38). This give a system of strict
inequalities in the form
~ MI ~ V > b
We want to check if (p0;p1) makes this linear system feasible with at least one solution ~ V = ~ v. We
exploit the fact that this is equivalent to
￿ ~ MI~ v + b < 0 for some ~ v
() solution to " min
(~ v;t)
t s.t. ￿ ~ MI~ v + b ￿ 10t " is strictly negative
() solution to " min
(~ v;t)
t s.t. ￿ ~ MI~ v ￿ 10t ￿ ￿b " is strictly negative
Standard linear programming algorithms can be used for checking the feasibility of the system. For
the p0 observed, collecting all p1 that makes the system feasible gives the ISRCO.
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